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Monterey, California



THESIS

**CORE COMPETENCY NEEDS ANALYSIS FOR U.S.
NAVAL RESERVE TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION
OF RESERVE (TAR) OFFICERS**

by

Carol E. Newman

March 2002

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Alice Crawford
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This thesis identifies fundamental Reserve management-related core competencies required for Training and Administration of the Reserve (TAR) officers. In-depth interviews were conducted with 21 experienced TAR officers who defined and described essential competencies for TAR officers. Additionally, they identified competency gaps and offered recommendations as to how TAR officers could better develop the competencies. Based on the analysis of the interview data, nine core competencies were determined. Interview participants then prioritized the nine competencies by responding to an electronic survey. The thesis describes each competency, prioritizes the competencies, and discusses the skill gaps that currently exist among TAR officers. Recommendations for a TAR officer professional development program are provided that address billet- or career phase-based training needs.

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**CORE COMPETENCY NEEDS ANALYSIS FOR U.S. NAVAL RESERVE
TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION OF RESERVE (TAR) OFFICERS**

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This thesis identifies fundamental Reserve management-related core competencies required for Training and Administration of the Reserve (TAR) officers. In-depth interviews were conducted with 21 experienced TAR officers who defined and described essential competencies for TAR officers. Additionally, they identified competency gaps and offered recommendations as to how TAR officers could better develop the competencies. Based on the analysis of the interview data, nine core competencies were determined. Interview participants then prioritized the nine competencies by responding to an electronic survey. The thesis describes each competency, prioritizes the competencies, and discusses the skill gaps that currently exist among TAR officers. Recommendations for a career-focused TAR officer professional development program are provided that address billet- or career phase-based training needs.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Each job in the Navy will be analyzed with respect to its essential knowledge, skills and abilities...we can do a better job in understanding the underlying knowledge, skills and abilities that sailors need to demonstrate at the different leadership levels. ...*Chief of Naval Personnel, 2002* (1)

A. BACKGROUND

The U.S. Naval Reserve Force, which numbers over 690,000 men and women, consists of the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The Selected Reserve includes drilling Reservists, who represent the primary source of immediate mobilization manpower for the Navy. The Naval Reserve force is managed by approximately 15,000 full-time active duty Reservists who are in the Training and Administration of the Reserve Force (TAR) program. The TAR officers, 1,605 in number, represent 12 different surface, air, and staff designators. Junior grade officers from either the regular Navy or from within the Reserve Force apply for and are assessed into the TAR community; officers are not commissioned directly into the TAR program.

Most TAR officer career paths consist of both operational sea/squadron tours and shore tours. Throughout their careers, TAR officers are expected to progress and develop in three areas: 1) their individual designator, 2) general Navy professionalism, and 3) Naval Reserve administration and management. Designator communities have policy-based professional development plans, with competency requirements and training milestones. In addition, the U.S. Navy has a leadership continuum program, which is required of all officers, regardless of designator. However, the TAR officer community possesses no established competency requirements, and no policy exists regarding the development and “growing” of TAR officers. Formal TAR officer professional development currently consists of several Reserve management/administration courses and on-the-job experience. Career and training paths among TAR officers can differ notably. Development of Naval Reserve management expertise differs among TAR officers, and the differing levels of Reserve expertise among TAR officers cannot be measured against any sort of “baseline” requirements, as no established TAR officer professional qualification standards exist.

Commander, Naval Reserve Force, the sponsor of this thesis, is concerned about the inconsistent basic knowledge level among TAR officers about Reserve management. The sponsor is interested in exploring the possibility of developing a “Personal Qualification Standards” (PQS) program, which would delineate a baseline level of competencies in key areas of Reserve management. However, no formal analysis has been conducted to identify essential TAR officer competencies or to specify the desired level of detail that TAR officers should attain in each competency.

B. PURPOSE

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is clearly interested in improving the quality and effectiveness of the Navy’s professional development programs. The CNO recently established the Task Force for Excellence through Commitment to Education and Learning. Task Force Excel has five vectors: professional development, personal development, leadership and professional military education, certifications and qualifications, and performance (2). Together, the five vectors represent an effort to revolutionize and revitalize Navy training. In a January 2002 Naval message announcing Task Force Excel, the CNO directed the Navy to conduct a knowledge, skills, and abilities analysis of every job in the Navy to assist the Navy in using those proven civilian work practices that are appropriate for Navy jobs. The CNO further stated that the Navy’s leadership continuum program could be improved by better understanding the knowledge, skills, and abilities sailors need at different leadership levels (1). As an application of the CNO’s direction, this study conducts a knowledge skills and abilities job analysis for the TAR officer community.

The purpose of this study is to identify, describe, and prioritize the fundamental Naval Reserve management-related core competencies that should be developed in all TAR officers, regardless of designator. It is recognized that different specific billets and officer career phases can pose different levels of competency requirements. Over the span of a career, each TAR officer should possess or be developing towards a fundamental level of Reserve management-related expertise. The goal of the research is to provide the Commander, Naval Reserve Force with recommendations for a baseline of Reserve-related knowledge and expertise requirements for TAR officers. The core competencies identified in this needs analysis can ultimately serve as the foundation of a

TAR officer professional development program designed to facilitate attainment of the core competencies during a TAR officer's career.

The primary research question is:

- What Naval Reserve management-related core competencies are essential for a TAR officer?

The secondary research questions are:

- For each of the core competencies identified, at what level of detail should a TAR officer be fluent or capable? (i.e., the breadth and depth of each competency.)
- What level of importance or priority should each core competency have?

C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The study includes: (1) an overview of major areas of knowledge/competencies identified to be essential for TAR officers, and (2) a description and prioritization of each of the core competencies. This study addresses those Naval Reserve management-related core competencies that are common across the entire spectrum of TAR officers, because these competencies embody the unique role and requirements of the TAR officer community. It does not explore competencies that are not unique to Naval Reserve management, such as officer warfare expertise specific to a designator community.

Research methodology focuses on determining those core competencies most valued by experts in Reserve management. Findings are based on in-depth interviews with 21 experienced, primarily senior TAR officers representing the major designator communities. Seventeen personal interviews and four telephone interviews were conducted. The interview participants were, at the time of the interviews, either assigned to one of the three major Naval Reserve commands—Commander, Naval Reserve Force; Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force, or Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force — were assigned as Reserve Liaison Officers at major U.S. Navy commands, or assigned to other Reserve activities. Interview participants were not a random sample of TAR officers. Participants were seasoned TAR officers with a spectrum of TAR tours and a variety of designator backgrounds. They were selected to obtain experience-based, but varying, perspectives regarding TAR officer core competencies.

As a complement to the interviews, a survey was conducted to obtain prioritization of the core competencies. A list of all competencies identified in the interviews was sent electronically to all interview participants; each respondent returned a prioritized list of these competencies, which was then compiled, analyzed and summarized.

D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

This thesis is comprised of six chapters. The first chapter introduces the topic and explains the purpose and methodology of the study. Chapter II depicts the role and composition of the Naval Reserve and the TAR program. Chapter III presents a literature review covering the topics of core competencies, needs analysis, and qualitative research. Chapter IV describes the study methodology, including the use of semi-structured interviews and a survey. Chapter V presents the data from the research. Each core competency identified in the interviews is defined and described. The competencies are listed in order of how essential each is considered by the study participants. The electronic survey-generated prioritization of the competencies is presented. A discussion of competency gaps is next presented, followed by a presentation of suggestions for increasing the level of competency expertise. Chapter V discusses implications of establishing required baseline TAR officer competencies. Chapter VI summarizes the results, draws conclusions regarding TAR officer core competencies and offers recommendations for consideration.

II. BACKGROUND

A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

This chapter provides a background of the Naval Reserve TAR program. First, a description of the mission of the Naval Reserve is provided. A profile of each of the specific categories comprising the Naval Reserve is presented next. The Naval Reserve organizational structure is discussed, including descriptions of the highest to the lowest echelons of command in this large organization. Then, a profile is presented of the TAR officer community including the size, composition and typical tour assignments of members of this community. Lastly, the training and development of TAR officers is described, including discussions of formal coursework and on-the-job training. Appendix A, an acronym guide, provides a useful reference for terms contained in this report.

B. NAVAL RESERVE TAR PROGRAM

1. Naval Reserve Mission

The U.S. Reserve forces have their roots in the colonial-era tradition of a Reserve militia. In 1887, the Navy Department developed a plan where the Secretary of the Navy could lend each state having a naval militia one of the Navy's older ships, as well as equipment, to "promote drills and instruction." Congress established a Federal Naval Reserve in 1915. Today's U.S. Naval Reserve Force provides mission-capable units and individuals to the active duty U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces throughout a full range of peacetime and wartime operations (3). As stated in the Naval Reserve mobilization plan, "The capability of the U.S. to expand its active force rapidly and efficiently through mobilization of the Reserve Component is essential in deterring potential enemies and reassuring our allies."(4) The Naval Reserve, which represents 20 percent of the Navy's total assets, plays an increasingly significant role in the operational requirements of the active Navy.

2. Profile of Reservists

The U.S. Naval Reserve Force, which numbers over 690,000 men and women, consists of the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve is comprised of (SELRES) personnel and Individual Ready Reserve personnel (IRR) (5). SELRES are comprised of drilling Reservists and TAR personnel. Drilling

Reservist SELRES are assigned to pay billets in Reserve units and perform 48 drills (typically two days per month) plus two weeks of annual training (AT) duty per year. Members who are not assigned a pay billet are in the IRR, however, some IRR members may voluntarily drill without pay (6). There are about 73,000 drilling Reservists, comprised of about 56,000 enlisted personnel and about 17,000 officers (7). These drilling Reservists represent the primary source of immediate mobilization manpower for the Navy.

Reserve training during drill weekends is usually held at the nearest Naval Reserve Center or Naval Air Reserve activity. The required two-week AT is typically performed at a Reserve unit's active duty "gaining command," which is generally the command to which the unit would mobilize. Annual training can be performed virtually anywhere in the world aboard ships, at naval shore and air bases, or at various training sites.

3. Organizational Structure

The Naval Reserve is headed by a Vice Admiral, who is a drilling Reservist recalled to active duty and who reports directly to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). This admiral simultaneously holds three positions: Director of Naval Reserve, Chief of Naval Reserves, and Commander, Naval Reserve Force (COMNAVRESFOR). COMNAVRESFOR is an "echelon II" command, as it falls directly under the echelon I CNO. Commands administratively subordinate to COMNAVRESFOR include Naval Surface Reserve Force (COMSURFRESFOR) and Naval Air Reserve Force (COMNAVAIRESFOR). These echelon III commands are each headed by a TAR Rear Admiral. COMNAVRESFOR, along with these subordinate commands, is located in New Orleans, Louisiana. Training and Administration of the Reserve officers, usually at the 0-5 and 0-6 levels, TAR enlisted personnel, and a complement of civil service personnel, man these large staff commands.

The Surface and Air commands each have a distinctly separate chain of subordinate commands. On the Surface side, echelon IV commands include nine regional Reserve Readiness Commands (REDCOMs), manned by TARs. In addition, echelon IV commands which administratively, but not operationally, report to COMNAVSURFRESFOR include Naval Reserve Force ships, Mobile Inshore Undersea

Warfare units, and Special Boat units; all are manned by TARs and serve as weekend drill and AT sites for Reserve units. Surface echelon V commands include 156 Naval Reserve Centers (RESCENs), which are geographically dispersed throughout the country and are manned by TARs. Drilling reservists in 1,522 “augment” units (units without stand-alone, operational platforms/equipment) are assigned to the Reserve units that comprise Surface echelon VI commands.

On the Air side, echelon IV commands include five Naval Air Station or Naval Air Facilities and six Naval Air Reserves (NARs). Air echelon V commands include seven Naval Air Reserve Centers (NARCENs) and 39 Reserve Force Squadrons (RESFORONs). The activities at both of echelons IV and V are manned almost completely by TAR personnel and serve as key weekend drill and AT sites for Reserve units. Overall, there are approximately 400 Air Reserve units at the echelon VI level, including both commissioned and augment units.

4. TAR Officers

As pronounced in Department of Defense policy, the mission of full-time support to the Reserve Components is to assist in the organization, administration, recruitment, instruction, training, maintenance, and supply support to the Reserve components (8). The TAR program was established in 1952 to provide for full-time management of the Naval Reserve (9). TAR personnel deploy just as active-component, regular Navy personnel do, and are career active duty members, eligible for full regular retirement after 20 years of active service. There are approximately 15,000 enlisted and officer members of the TAR program.

There are 1,694 TAR officer billets (10). As detailed in Table 1, the TAR officer community consists of 1,605 officers, representing 12 different surface, air, and staff designators.

(TOTAL NUMBERS/PERCENTAGE)

Designator		Total	CAPT	CDR	LCDR	LT	LTJG	ENS
Fleet Support	1107	138 / 8.6	10 / 0.6	26 / 1.6	68 / 4.2	31 / 1.9	2 / 0.1	1 / 0.1
Surface Warfare	1117	381 / 23.7	49 / 3.1	127 / 7.9	169 / 10.5	35 / 2.2	1 / 0.1	0 / 0.0
Submarine Warfare	1127	34 / 2.1	2 / 0.1	11 / 0.7	20 / 1.2	1 / 0.1	0 / 0.0	0 / 0.0
Special Warfare	1137	37 / 2.3	1 / 0.1	17 / 1.1	19 / 1.2	0 / 0.0	0 / 0.0	1 / 0.0
Special Operations	1147	37 / 2.3	3 / 0.2	11 / 0.7	21 / 1.3	2 / 0.1	0 / 0.0	0 / 0.0
Training for Surface	1167	5 / 0.3	0 / 0.0	0 / 0.0	0 / 0.0	0 / 0.0	0 / 0.0	5 / 0.3
Naval Aviator	1317	530 / 33.0	42 / 2.6	95 / 5.9	282 / 17.6	111 / 6.9	0 / 0.0	0 / 0.0
Naval Flight Officer	1327	148 / 9.2	22 / 1.4	43 / 2.7	65 / 4.0	18 / 1.1	0 / 0.0	0 / 0.0
Aerospace Engineering	1527	90 / 5.6	1 / 0.1	14 / 0.9	43 / 2.7	26 / 1.6	6 / 0.4	0 / 0.0
Intelligence	1637	73 / 4.5	5 / 0.3	18 / 1.1	31 / 1.9	16 / 1.0	3 / 0.2	0 / 0.0
TAR Recruiter	1687	27 / 1.7	0 / 0.0	0 / 0.0	19 / 1.2	8 / 0.5	0 / 0.0	0 / 0.0
Supply	3107	105 / 6.5	10 / 0.6	29 / 1.8	38 / 2.4	21 / 1.3	7 / 0.4	0 / 0.0
Total:		1605 / 100.0	145 / 9.0	391 / 24.4	775 / 48.3	269 / 16.8	19 / 1.2	6 / 0.4

Table 1. TAR Officer Inventory by Designator and Rank (Total Numbers/Percentage).
From: BUPERS (Pers-4417). Numbers as of October 2001

These officers serve in a balance of operational tours and shore Reserve management tours. Operational tours include assignments on ships and in aviation squadrons. Shore Reserve management tours include assignments at a RESCEN, REDCOM, or NAR – all of which are administrative, rather than operational, activities.

In general, Surface/Submarine/Special Warfare officers and Fleet Support officers (all line officers) are under the cognizance of the Surface side of the Reserve house. These officers represent about 39 percent of all TAR officers. Aviators and Naval Flight officers (line officers), and Aerospace Engineering Duty and Intelligence officers (both staff officers) typically occupy billets that are under the Air Reserve. These Air officers comprise about 54 percent of all TAR officers. Supply Corps officers (staff officers), who represent almost 7 percent of all TAR officers, may be assigned to a variety of Surface and Air Reserve activities. Only line officers may assume command of a Reserve activity, such as a RESCEN or NAR.

Officer candidates are not commissioned directly into the TAR program; junior grade officers (personnel with the ranks of LTJG, LT or LCDR) from either the regular Navy or from within the Reserve Force apply and are “redesignated” or accessed into the TAR program. Common reasons why officers choose transfer to the TAR program include: greater opportunity for command earlier in one’s career; more geographically

diverse options for U.S. shore assignments, and the attractiveness of belonging to a smaller officer community than that of the U.S. Navy.

In some ways, TAR officers and regular Navy officers are quite similar. TAR officer promotional opportunities and “flow points” are commensurate with their regular Navy peers. TAR officers must train in and perform at the same warfare and staff officer professional standards as their Regular Navy counterparts. Yet, TAR officers are dual-hatted. They also must be proficient in the mission of the TAR community, which is to manage and administer the Reserve program. As compared to their regular Navy peers, TAR officers often serve in more diverse assignments, due to the dual track of operational and reserve management assignments. In addition, since junior officers command many RESCENs, TAR officers, at least on the Surface side, are more likely than their regular Navy peers to be in command of an activity. While part of the greater U.S. Navy, the Naval Reserve is a markedly different organization. It has unique policies and procedures regarding funding, training, and manpower. In addition, the Naval Reserve must plan for and manage the mobilization of Reservists. Overall, the differences between the Regular Navy and the Naval Reserve create a challenging learning curve for TAR officers. TAR officers need a significant amount of time to adjust to the Reserve environment and to acquire the specialized knowledge of the Reserve component (11).

C. TAR OFFICER TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Formal Coursework

The Naval Reserve Professional Development Center (NAVRESPROFDEVVCEN), located in New Orleans, provides formal instruction to the Naval Reserve Force in the areas of training, administration, management, career information, operation, and software system maintenance (12). Sixteen courses are offered, of which four are applicable to TAR officers. The TAR Officer Accession Course (TOA) provides indoctrination to the Naval Reserve for new TAR officers. This five-day course is typically mandatory for officers in the Surface Reserve. However, TAR officers in the Air Reserve typically are not sent to this course; COMNAVAIRESFOR periodically offers its own TAR officer indoctrination course. The Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO) Course is for TAR officers assigned to be a

CO of a RESCEN. This course exposes officers to the administrative functions of a Surface Reserve center. As this course is geared towards RESCEN management, only TAR officers under COMNAVSURFRESFOR cognizance typically take the course. The RESCEN Training Officer (TO) course is, for the same reason, only applicable for Surface-side TAR officers. (In addition, many RESCEN Training Officers are senior enlisted personnel, rather than commissioned officers, so not as many TAR officers take the TO course as compared to the PCO course.) The Reserve Officer Liaison (RLO) course is offered for officers assigned to serve as a liaison with a Regular Navy command, typically at a large staff command. This course, while only offered to those officers in RLO billets, is applicable to officers under both Air and Surface commands.

The TAR courses offered by NAVRESPROFDEVVCEN are very valuable. However, no formal training needs analysis has been conducted to determine whether course content matches the competency needs of TAR officers. In addition, while many diverse TAR billets and different officer career phases each possess unique learning needs, the formal coursework largely targets and is applicable to certain billets and career phases, rather than to the spectrum of TAR officer work experiences. As mentioned earlier, no professional competencies for TAR officers have been established, making it difficult to analyze the “fit” of course curriculum to TAR officer professional requirements.

2. On-the-Job Training

Aside from the TAR officer courses mentioned above, TAR officer professional development is a product of on-the-job (OJT) training. TAR officers’ career paths can differ markedly. Surface TAR officers who are warfare qualified typically alternate sea tours with shore Reserve management tours. Some spend the majority of their shore tours at lower echelon (e.g., RESCEN, REDCOM) activities, while others, typically more senior officers, may spend more shore time at higher echelon commands (e.g., COMNAVSURFRESFOR, COMNAVRESFOR, Bureau of Naval Personnel).

Air TAR officers’ career paths can diverge even more strongly. Many Air TAR officers perform a series of operational tours at RESFORONs or Reserve Air Wings, with the career goal of assuming command of a RESFORON. Junior officers on this track may have almost no experience in Reserve management and administration; as such duties are

often the responsibility of the supporting NAR or NARCEN. Other Air officers perform a series of Reserve management and administration tours at NARCENs and NARs, with the goal of assuming command of a NAR. Like Surface officers, senior Air TAR officers often also serve tours at major commands. For Air officers on the operational “track”, such major staff tours may be their first direct exposure to the administrative policies and procedures of the Naval Reserve. Overall, the nonstandard career paths for TAR officers result in widely differing levels of OJT regarding Reserve management.

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

The Naval Reserve is a large and diverse organization, with significant differences from the regular Navy. These differences create a challenging management environment for TAR officers. Due to varying OJT and formal training experiences, TAR officers receive inconsistent exposure to Naval Reserve management. In general, therefore, TAR officers do not share or consistently develop towards a fundamental baseline of knowledge and expertise in their TAR mission. Establishment of TAR officer baseline core competencies in Naval Reserve management could provide the foundation for a program to develop consistent, basic-level expertise among TAR officers during their career.

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III. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

This chapter reviews published literature pertaining to a core competency needs analysis. First, an overview of organizational training and development literature is presented, in which definitions of a needs assessment and of core competencies are provided. Second, a review of literature on qualitative research is presented. This review includes a discussion of various qualitative research methodologies and of the various advantages of qualitative research.

B. COMPETENCY NEEDS ASSESSMENT

The process of determining worker/job knowledge and expertise requirements is commonly referred to in organizational training literature as a “needs assessment.” The classic training system, as described by Muchinsky (13), describes four phases of a classic training system: needs assessment, training and development, evaluation, and training validity levels. The foundation of the entire training process is the first phase – the needs assessment, as training objectives comprise the output of this phase. It is important that training accurately reflect the competencies required by the job, the organization, and the individual, and not just reflect the personal agenda or assumptions of management or other training decision-makers. The needs assessment phase strives to produce training needs, based on an objective exploration of the target workers’ job environment and requirements.

O’Connor, Bronner, and Delaney (14) describe a training needs assessment as “the process of identifying what employees need to learn,” adding that this assessment identifies “what the members of an organization need to learn in order for the enterprise to achieve its goals.” The needs assessment has two phases. First, the job requirements must be identified, which means determining what an effective worker *should* know or in what he or she should be competent. The second step involves exploring the potential gap between the desired or required worker competencies and the worker’s *actual* competencies – in essence, identifying or measuring the “gap” in worker competencies. Subsequent training development should address any identified gaps in required competencies.

Understanding a job's skill or knowledge requirements, as well as any worker deficiencies in meeting these requirements, is critical to properly targeting the content and intended participants of a training program. Hence, the needs assessment is an essential foundation to development an effective training program.

A key element of the needs assessment is identifying the knowledge, skills and abilities ("KSAs") required to perform a job. As described by Muchinsky, knowledge refers to the body of information that enables adequate job performance; skill refers to operational abilities, often in terms of psychomotor abilities, and ability refers to those cognitive capabilities required by a job (13). Goldstein and Ford describe that, first, a task analysis is created, which states the specific activities or work operations performed on the job (15). Then, KSAs may be developed by forming meaningful task clusters.

Training literature uses the terms "KSAs" and "competencies" almost interchangeably, but it also provides distinctions. O'Connor, et al. conclude that, in basically any job there are "core competencies" that the jobholder must master (14). The concept of core competencies may encompass tangible job skills and job-related knowledge, as well as an understanding of management philosophy and organizational culture. While O'Connor et al. (14) put core competencies only in the context of learning for the job; a broader definition of core competencies would encompass the three dimensions of the organization, the individual, and the job/task. Nemerov and Schoonover, who conducted a survey regarding competency-based human resource applications, define competencies as "groupings of behavior that encompass the knowledge, skills, attitudes, motives, and temperament that distinguish excellent performers (16)."

Pritchard indicates that core competencies are KSAs that are essential for worker success, or, KSAs that distinguish superior performance from average performance (17). Similarly, Goldstein and Ford suggest that competencies are those KSAs consistently used by exemplary performers across the organization (15).

Broadbent and Froidevaux, who use the term "work analysis" as an umbrella term to include job study, task analysis, performance analysis, and competency studies, also distinguish between KSAs and competencies (18). According to these authors, the key

question to be asked when conducting a competency study is: “What are the high-level skills required?” Thus, literature, when it does distinguish between KSAs and competencies, implies that competencies are “high-level” KSAs, in essence, knowledge and expertise that required performing above that required by a fairly simple job task. Competencies may better reflect those KSAs of professional-level workers, or those who need to use a relatively high level of thought processes to perform their job. It is the understanding of this author that a competency is a KSA that has been attained beyond a certain minimum, fundamental level. That is, to have a competency is to claim a professional level of expertise in certain knowledge, skill or ability. Thus, for this study, a competency is defined as knowledge or expertise required by a professional-level worker, such as a TAR officer.

C. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

Needs assessment techniques can be quantitative or qualitative, and include questionnaires, interviews, focus groups, observation, and work samples. Babbie states that qualitative research embodies research methods other than those that produce data appropriate for quantitative (statistical) analysis (20). That is, qualitative research produces data, which, while valid, is not easily reduced into numbers. Quantitative research, such as conducting a survey, is very appropriate when the information sought can be transformed into a standard, somewhat inflexible, structured questionnaire, which can be repeatedly administered to obtain quantitative data, such as frequencies and means. The advantages of administering a survey are the ability to reach a large sample and the relative ease in querying with standardized, predominantly closed-ended questions.

To design a survey, the researcher must first have a preconceived model of the potential answers to each survey question, in order to design a survey that accommodates all potential answers. If the potential answers have not yet been determined, that is, if a model of the phenomenon under study has not been developed, then qualitative research can be an appropriate method of gathering data to build such a model.

Qualitative, semi-structured interviews are very appropriate in field research, as the interview method is flexible and allows for in-depth probing into the subject matter. In a qualitative interview, the interviewer, in essence, carries on a conversation with the

respondent and pursues information by asking questions to guide the conversation towards the subject under study. Based on the answers obtained from each question, the interviewer can shape and customize subsequent questions to best probe for information. To gain an initial understanding of job competencies, particularly those of a more cognitive or knowledge-based nature, rather than those of a more skill-based job, personal interviews may be the method of choice. This method allows for probing, open-ended questions, which may reveal diverse or even unanticipated responses. Also, in a personal interview, the interviewer can capture information both directly from the words spoken by the respondent as well as by observing various aspects of the respondent's behavior, such as the respondent's tone of voice or use of gestures.

Survey participants are often randomly selected from a population. In addition, a survey's sample size is often large enough to produce results that are statistically significant. In contrast, interview participants are typically selected from a target group of interest and comprise a sample size too small for statistical analysis. However, if the interview participants represent the target group, then the data obtained from the interviews can offer valuable generalizations about the group of interest.

Interviews often are transcribed to allow for accuracy and comprehensive gathering of material discussed in the interview. Coding or classifying this qualitative data is typically performed to categorize the responses into meaningful, discrete items (20). Unlike a survey questionnaire, in which every question yields valuable, useful information, often material transcribed from the interview will not later be deemed significant for purposes of analysis and reporting. Much of what the researcher must do is to carefully filter out the significant data from the transcripts, to hone in on material that can yield results pertinent to the study. As detailed by Babbie, the entire interview process follows seven steps: clarifying the purpose of the interviews, designing the interview process, conducting the actual interviews, transcribing the interviews into text, analyzing the material gathered, verifying the reliability of the material, and reporting the findings (19).

As mentioned, qualitative research does not produce numbers that can be statistically analyzed at acceptably significant confidence levels. However, the flexibility

and probing-nature of qualitative interviews can foster gathering of in-depth information, which can be a valuable predecessor for subsequent quantitative research. When conducted appropriately, with unbiased approaches, qualitative research methods can produce valid and valuable results.

The objective of this study is to determine discrete TAR officer core competencies – information that has not before been identified. The information sought could not easily have been obtained through administration of a survey, because survey design typically is based on prior identification of fundamental response options. Once the specific competencies have been determined, a survey that addresses these competencies could offer additional information. However, in this exploratory research phase, qualitative research is appropriate, as it employs methodologies suitable for personal, in-depth exploration of the subject matter. The application of such methodologies will be further discussed in the next chapter.

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IV. METHODOLOGY

A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

This chapter provides a detailed discussion of the methodology used in the collection and analysis of data for the study. First, a description of the study participants is provided. Then, the two stages of data collection are presented. The first stage was the interviews, of which the majority were personal interviews and the remainder were telephone interviews. In the second stage, an electronic survey was administered to the same participants as those in the first, interview stage.

B. STUDY PARTICIPANTS

A sample of 21 TAR officers was chosen for participation in this study. The objective in selecting participants was target to TAR officers who possess significant and varied experience in managing the Naval Reserve. The participants, nearly all senior officers, are considered to be leaders in the TAR officer community and, due to the breadth and depth of their Naval Reserve management experience, in an excellent position to offer meaningful insight regarding TAR officer competencies.

Of the 21 participants, 12 possess the rank of captain (0-6), seven hold the rank of commander (0-5), and the remaining two participants hold the rank of lieutenant commander (0-4). This rank distribution is not representative of the entire TAR officer community, in which 10 percent are captains, 26 percent are commanders, 46 percent are lieutenant commanders, and the remaining 18 percent are lieutenants or below. Senior officers were the targeted participants in the study. Since the study examines the competencies and characteristics that should be developed in TAR officers during their career, it was considered appropriate to focus on seasoned TAR officers, who have personally achieved success in their TAR careers. The insight they could offer is a product both of the extensive experience in their own TAR officer career development, and also from their observation of, interaction with, and guidance to junior TAR officers throughout their careers. Most participants have been TAR officers for many years. About half the participants have been TAR officers for 16-23 years, and the remaining have been TARs for 15 or fewer years.

The sample represented line officers from various designators. Of the participants, 11 are surface warfare officers, five are air warfare officers, three are fleet support officers and one is a special operations officer. As compared to the actual designator proportions of the TAR officer community, the sample is slightly weighted towards surface warfare officers. However, representation exists in all the three primary designator groups, those of surface warfare, air warfare, and fleet support.

All of the participants have had a varied background of TAR assignments. Each of the surface officer participants have tour backgrounds as Commanding Officer of a Naval Reserve Center, ship tours onboard both U.S. Navy and Reserve ships, and as Commanding Officer or Chief of Staff or Manpower/Training Department Head at a regional Reserve Readiness Command. The Fleet Support officer participants have similar tour backgrounds to the surface participants, less the sea tours. The air officer participants' tour assignments include operational tours, such as those with a Reserve Force squadron, and administrative tours, such as those at a Naval Air Reserve. In addition to these fairly community-specific TAR tours, all sample participants have had major staff experience at such commands as the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Commander, Naval Reserve Force (or its Surface/Air subordinate major commands), the Chief of Naval Operations, or on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief ("CINC") of a major Naval force. Of note, four of the participants have experience serving as Reserve Liaison Officers for major U. S. Navy commands.

C. METHODS FOR COLLECTING AND ANALYZING DATA

The data for this study were obtained in two steps. First, semi-structured interviews were conducted, which gave participants the opportunity to express their thoughts concerning TAR officer competencies. The procedure is explained in greater detail in the next section. Once the data gathered in the first step were analyzed, a list of all competencies identified by the participants was generated. In the second step of the study, this list was implemented into an electronic survey, which was administered to the interview participants. The survey requested that participants prioritize the core competencies in order of how essential they are, and to return their survey electronically. The collected surveys were then manually compiled to determine the overall prioritization of the core competencies.

1. Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with all of the 21 participants. Twelve face-to-face interviews were conducted one-on-one with each individual; two interviews were conducted face-to-face with two participants together, and another face-to-face interview with three participants together. In addition to the face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews were conducted with four individuals.

The same interview protocol was used for all interviews. Appendix B provides the interview protocol. Each interview began with a brief introduction by the researcher and several questions to gather demographic data from the participants. The primary questions in each interview were designed to identify the core competencies that TAR officers should possess, and to determine what level of detailed expertise is required for each competency. Additional questions were posed to determine what competency gaps were perceived by the participants, as well as what recommendations the participants could offer to close the perceived competency gaps. The interview method allowed for use of open-ended questions, which permitted the interviewer to probe and explore the fundamental job responsibilities and requirements of the study's target population and to probe for expanded clarification to questions. At the conclusion of each interview, the participants were notified that a subsequent electronic survey would be sent to them, in which they would be asked to prioritize the list of competencies identified from the interviews.

The interviews, on average, lasted about 40 minutes, ranging from 30 minutes to 50 minutes. The interviews, both personal and telephone, were recorded on audiocassettes. (One interview was not recorded; the researcher took notes during this interview.) The audiocassettes were transcribed verbatim into Microsoft Word documents. Analysis of the transcriptions was then accomplished. The researcher studied the transcriptions to identify competency themes presented by the participants. If a specific competency was identified, then that competency was placed on a list, along with a short description that clarified the competency and/or gave an example of it. In some cases, a participant presented a competency that could be considered a component of a competency already mentioned by other participants or a competency that, in different words, was one already presented. Consideration was given to, as much as

possible, capture each competency without overlapping or repeating concepts. Each transcript was analyzed in an iterative manner, which involved going back and forth from the interview data to the identifications of competencies. The comprehensive list of all specific competencies was then categorized into nine competencies; the basis of this categorization was to define competencies that were, as much as possible, discrete and unique from one another. While some inherent overlap was found to exist across several competencies, the categorization resulted in nine fundamental competencies.

2. Electronic Survey

An electronic survey was conducted to determine how essential the interviewees consider each competency to be for TAR officers. A copy of this survey is provided as Appendix C. The survey contained a list of the nine competencies; a short description of each competency was provided to further define and differentiate the competencies from each other. In a cover letter to the electronic survey, the participants were asked to review the attached list of competencies, then to prioritize the nine competencies to indicate how essential each competency is for TAR officers. The participants were instructed to indicate their prioritization by annotating a number (1 for most essential; 9 for least essential) next to each competency.

Of the 21 officers to whom the survey was sent, 18 completed and electronically returned the survey. Once the researcher electronically received the surveys, an average score was calculated for each competency. Then, based on these averages, a prioritization of the competencies was generated. This prioritization list indicates how essential the survey respondents, overall, consider each Naval Reserve management-related competency to be for TAR officers.

V. RESULTS

A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

This chapter presents the results of the interviews and of the electronic survey. First, each of the nine TAR officer core competencies that were abstracted from the interviews are defined and described. The competency descriptions are presented in order of how essential the participants perceived them to be, starting with the competency deemed most essential by the participants. The competencies, in the order presented in this chapter, are listed below:

- Understanding RESCEN/NAR/NARCEN department operations
- Understanding the Naval Reserve Force organization
- Understanding of manpower processes
- Expertise to be a commanding officer
- Understanding of the mobilization processes
- Ability to use/manipulate information systems
- Understanding of financial processes
- Expertise to be a staff officer
- Skills in project management

In each competency discussion, the competency is first defined and broadly described. In-depth descriptions are then provided to demonstrate the level of detailed knowledge required for the competency. Examples and illustrations, extracted from interviews, are provided to describe the breadth and depth of detail, as well as to offer personal perceptions of the interview participants regarding the competency. There also is a description of any perceived gaps between the required competency level and the competency level that currently exists among the TAR officer community.

Following the discussions of the nine competencies, the results of the electronic survey are presented. The prioritization of the competencies, in order of how essential each competency is considered by the survey participants, is presented.

The remainder of the chapter explores several pertinent issues revealed in the interviews. Potential reasons for gaps in TAR officer competencies, as perceived by the

interview participants, are provided. Next, suggestions from the interviewees regarding TAR officer competency development are presented. Lastly, there is a discussion of the implications of establishing TAR officer professional qualification standards, as expressed by interview participants. An encapsulation of the study results summarizes the chapter.

B. ESSENTIAL TAR OFFICER COMPETENCIES

1. Understanding RESCEN/NAR/NARCEN Department Operations

Field-level Reserve activities perform a wide range of customer services to the drilling Reservists, including processing training orders, obtaining uniforms, and ensuring Reservists are paid for their drills. The surface echelon V activities, and the air echelon IV and V activities, NARs and NARCENS, are the primary field-level activities to which Reserve units are administratively attached. Business operations basically consist of the processes conducted by functionally titled departments, including Training, Administration, Personnel, Pay, Medical, and Supply. The majority of the officers interviewed consider an understanding of the operations performed by the departments at these field-level Reserve activities to be a fundamental TAR officer competency.

This competency relies heavily on Naval instructions that define, describe, and mandate the functions and administrative processes performed at RESCENs, NARs and NARCENs. Hence, this competency is described by many interviewees as having knowledge of the pertinent instructions and their underlying policies regarding RESCEN or NAR/NARCEN department operations, as well having expertise in applying and communicating the rules, procedures and policies in appropriate situations.

At these field-level activities, TAR officers oversee and manage the processes performed by their enlisted staff and help resolve problems and questions that arise from the enlisted staff and Reservists. It is considered critical for TAR officers to know which instructions apply to specific processes and to be able to refer to and apply these instructions to find appropriate guidance for an issue. A wide spectrum of instructions pertains to Naval Reserve management. These instructions are generated by various sources, including regular Navy commands of the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS), Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), and Department of Defense (DoD), as well as Reserve commands of COMNAVRESFOR, COMNAVAIRESFOR,

COMNAVSURFRESFOR, and their lower echelon commands. The breadth and depth of instructions governing Reserve center operations, in addition to the periodic changes and updates to the instructions, create a challenging learning curve for TAR officers. In one interview, Officer E describes the need for TAR officers to know these instructions.

[TAR officers must] understand the instructions from the national level to [the] RESFOR versions... it is a world of new acronyms. That's the whole key to being a good TAR officer... Knowing the rules and what the definitions are and how they play, how they affect the Selected Reservists. Different types of drills, different colors of money, AT special, ADT...

The instructions most frequently mentioned by interviewees are CNRFINST 1001.5 (Administrative Procedures for the Selected Reserve and Participating Members of the Individual Ready Reserve) and BUPERSINST 1001.39 (Administrative Procedures for Naval Reservists on Inactive Duty). In several interviews, officers described these key instructions as the bible of the Naval Reserve. Officer F, below, supports this opinion.

Competencies that TAR officers should have [include] a through understanding of all of the information presented in the 1001.39, 1001.5. ... I think that any TAR that doesn't take the time to do the research and read the pertinent instructions is behind the power curve.

The third most mentioned instruction in the interviews was the Joint Federal Travel Regulations (JFTR), a DoD publication. The TAR Officer Assessment (TOA) course, discussed in Chapter II, gives new TAR officers broad exposure to the key instructions pertaining to Reserve training and administration. However, many interviewees are of the opinion that TAR officers, in general, do not invest the time and effort required to be sufficiently familiar with these instructions.

Several interviewees give similar examples of the necessary knowledge regarding field-level Reserve activity department operations. Knowledge of the different types of Reserve orders, including the travel and entitlement implications associated with each type, is considered one of the most important aspects of this competency. Drilling Reservists, to be prepared for mobilization, are expected to train to achieve readiness. They typically perform four four-hour “drills” per weekend; each drill period is referred

to as an Inactive Duty Training (IDT). Any drills performed off-site, involving travel, are referred to as Inactive Duty Travel (IDTT). These Reservists also perform a two-week Annual Training (AT) per year. Additional periods include Active Duty Training (ADT) and Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW). For each of these drill or training periods, the drilling Reservist is considered to be on active duty. Each of these different types of weekend drills or training periods has a distinct set of orders. In addition, the different types of orders for each can have correspondingly different travel and family entitlement ramifications.

In a fairly mechanical sense, the competency of being able to manage the orders and training processes consists of knowing: the differences between the types of orders; the implications for each type of order, with respect to pay, travel and entitlements, and what type of orders are most appropriate for different situations. Below, Officer B discusses this aspect of the competency.

Your family's entitlement, should you get killed, changes significantly depending on what type of orders you are carrying in your pocket.... Clearly you [TAR officers] need to know the types of orders and you need to know two things about those orders. You need to know why legal ramifications exist around those orders. And you need to know what entitlement exists around those orders. You need to know base documents... the JFTR is the fundamental base document. [If asked], "What are the legal ramifications of IDT?" we [TAR officers] should be able to give the right answer. What I've seen from experience is that's really not the case. It is a core competency knowledge you ought to know.

TAR officers need basic definitional knowledge of the Reserve vocabulary and acronyms, referred to by Officer J as "a very complicated alphabet soup of AT, ADT, ADSW." Familiarity with the Reserve-pertinent instructions is critical for gaining a basic understanding of the Reserve center's function in administrating Reservists. Officer E poses questions regarding AT that TAR officers should be able to answer.

How many days are folks authorized by the instruction for AT? Beyond that, can they do less and still get a qualified year? ... Now if a drilling Reservist did an ADT, does he have to do his AT? That's where a Reservist tries to pull the wool over young TAR's eyes. [The Reservist says] "I haven't done my AT. I have to do it." No, you don't. Because you only get so many points a year and a point is a point. It doesn't matter what color of money you utilize. A point is a point.

As implied by the interviewees, questions such as those above can be resolved by referring to the guidance in the appropriate instruction. Several interviewees make a distinction between the levels of detailed instruction-based knowledge TAR officers need to know. It is felt that TAR officers should know which instruction to refer to in order to find answers and guidance on any potential topic, rather than actually memorizing the contents of each instruction. Officer P describes this competency as being that of a researcher, who must know where to search for information.

TARs must know...how to get Navy directives... how to look stuff up to get answers to SELRES's weird questions. They don't need to know everything, but need to know where to go, what source... How to use the Internet to do research, be a librarian, get answers.

Officer C also presents the view that TAR officers should be required to have a general, rather than specific, knowledge of the contents of each instruction.

You don't have it memorized but you know where to go. ...Not necessarily having had committed [each instruction] to memory, but certainly knowing what it says and where to find the answer.

Officer S describes the level of knowledge required to understand the training function at a surface Reserve center, using the word "working" to mean general, versus specific.

[TAR officers need a] working knowledge. I need to understand what an ITP [Individual Training Plan] is. I don't need to know the details of how to fill out that ITP, but I need to be able to understand how important that ITP is to the Reservists, and what the relationship of that ITP is to that gaining command. You need to be able to relay that to individuals who work for you [enlisted staff]. You'll have E-4, E-5, E-6s who have less experience than a RESCEN CO. So you [TARs] need to have a working knowledge of training.

Other interviewees firmly feel that TAR officers must possess a very in-depth knowledge of the rules, instructions and policies regarding the training and administration of the Reserve. These two opinions are not necessarily contradictory. An in-depth understanding of the content of instructions and policies may not require verbatim memorization; the interviewees imply that, while knowing where to go for an answer is absolutely required, a very sound, fundamental understanding of the guidance covered in each instruction is also expected.

The rules and procedures pertaining to department operations at a surface or air Reserve center are primarily found in instructions. However, several interviewees indicate that TAR officers must, in addition to knowing the printed rules and procedures, understand the rules in the context of the overall mission of serving the active Navy. This competency includes both the instruction-based “how to” for field-level reserve activity operations, as well as “why” these possess and their governing rules exist. Thus, this competency includes knowing the rules and processes regarding RESCEN/NAR/NARCEN department operations, as well as understanding the logic and reasoning behind them, to best apply the instructions.

Training and Administration of Reserve officers need to understand the functions and operational processes of each of the departments at a surface RESCEN or air NAR/NARCEN; this understanding should be grounded in a familiarity with the pertinent Reserve and national instructions pertaining to the administration of the Reserve force. This knowledge is important for all TAR officers – both junior and senior officers. Many interviewees feel that TAR officers, overall, do not sufficiently possess this fundamental competency.

2. Understanding the Naval Reserve and its “Fit” with the Active Navy

An understanding of the Naval Reserve organization is considered to be a fundamental TAR officer competency by about half of the officers interviewed. The competency described in this section is rather broad in scope and includes an understanding of: the Naval Reserve mission, its administrative and organizational organizations; the Naval Reserve’s relationship and “fit” with the active Navy, and the role of the Naval Reserve in the context of the larger DoD organization.

The mission of the U.S. Navy, as stated on its website, is “to maintain, train and equip combat-ready naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas.” As promulgated by the Commander, Naval Reserve Force, the mission of the U.S. Naval Reserve Force is “to provide mission-capable units and individuals to the Navy, Marine Corps Team throughout the full range of operations from peace to war.” Interviewees feel that if TAR officers and other Reservists do not know the mission of the active Navy, then they do not understand the mission of the Naval Reserve, since the purpose of the Naval Reserve is to support the active Navy’s

mission. Officers interviewed emphasize that everything the Naval Reserve does at every level should be viewed in the context of this greater mission. Officer A's statement encapsulates this concept.

[An understanding of] key roles and missions [is needed]...because, fundamentally, our strategic significance is that the Reserve Force is a manpower pool. We're part of the Navy's total force assets. When they need a quick surge of capability that's pre-trained they go grab the Reserve Force. All TARs need to have a basic understanding of that, because when you see how you fit in the bigger picture, you're going to have a better understanding of questions like: Where do billets come from? Where do units come from? How does mobilization work? Why we do a lot of things that we do.... Those issues all directly tie to what our overall Reserve force mission.... We're part of a strategic plan. ...They [active Navy] do strategic force planning and say, "Here's the force, here's what the Navy needs to do to meet its missions, and this portion is going to be handled by the Reserve Force." I don't think a lot of TARS understand that... So, you get some fundamental misunderstandings all the way down to the Reserve center and unit level on how the pieces fit. Having that context is important when you start looking at basic jobs we do at all levels: Making sure we're putting the people in the right billets; making sure we're doing the right training; making sure that they go to the right places for their AT, and that we're making effective use of our money. All of that needs to be in context. What's the end goal? The end goal is we meet this mission. We provide this manpower pool of pre-trained individuals to meet this portion of the Navy's mission.

Officer A, as well as other interviewees, imply that a broad, mission-based perspective is critical for TAR officers, as it helps them view the work of their Reserve units as part of the work of the active Navy.

Several interviewees feel that TAR officers also lack a sound understanding of the administrative organization of the Naval Reserve Force; they indicate that officers should be familiar with the organization from echelon II (COMNAVRESFOR) to echelon VI (Reserve units), including the function and scope of each echelon. There are many types of activities within the Naval Reserve Force, including Inshore Undersea Warfare Groups, an Expeditionary Logistics Supply Headquarters, Naval Air Stations, regional Reserve Readiness Commands, Naval Reserve Centers, and Naval Air Reserve Centers. Interviewees feel that this competency includes being aware of the many commands to which TAR officers are assigned. Not all TAR officers are assigned to Naval Reserve

activities; some are assigned to regular Navy shore commands and staffs or to regular Navy operational activities, including ships. An awareness of the TAR officer command structure within the Naval Reserve, in the opinion of several interviewees, can help TAR officers know where to go for assistance within their own community and can help them get answers or resolve problems at the lowest possible level within the organization.

Operational activities within the Naval Reserve, including Reserve ships and squadrons, also have an operational, as distinct from administrative, chain of command. Reserve operational assets provide direct interaction with, and support to, the active Navy, through exercises and on-going U.S. Navy operations. Several interviewees show concern that TAR officers, in general, lack knowledge of the Naval Reserve's operational forces and the role they play. Officer I expresses this concern.

We have TARS who don't even understand the Naval Reserve forces we have. [TARs] should be able to answer the man-on-the-street question of "How do your units interact operationally?" Some of our units roll as intact units into [regular Navy] battle group OPLANS, and some, in other parts of our organization augment the active duty commands that enter the operational environment or the support environment.... [TAR officers need to know] how we're organized to do the war-fighting mission.

Fundamental knowledge of the Naval Reserve operational forces should include an awareness of the types of Reserve operational units and their "hardware," such as ships, special boats, aircraft and support equipment. Interviewees imply that there is a knowledge gap among TAR officers regarding the Naval Reserve operational forces, and that this gap is greatest across warfare communities; aviation TARs lack sufficient knowledge of surface Reserve operational assets, while surface TARs lack sufficient knowledge of air Reserve operational assets.

One officer interviewed states that TARs have two types of customers – the drilling Reservists and the active Navy fleet. The nearly 80 TAR officers assigned as Reserve Liaison Officers (RLOs) serve as full-time links between the active Navy and the Naval Reserve at many major commands. The RLO also typically is the central point-of-contact for the Reserve activities assigned to support the active command. In their role as representatives for the Naval Reserve to the active Navy, RLOs should, in the opinion of the officers interviewed, be skilled advisors to both the active Navy and to the Naval

Reserve. However, as several interviewees state, all TAR officers--not just RLOs--should consider themselves to be advisors to the active Navy regarding Naval Reserve matters. In general, TAR officers should be prepared to provide advice and information to their gaining commands or CINCs regarding the types of support the Naval Reserve can provide and regarding the methods by which drilling Reservists can be assessed by the active Navy.

Each Reserve unit, whether aviation-, surface- or staff-focused, is designed to fit into and support the active Navy. One interviewee expresses concern that operationally focused TAR officers might downplay the importance of the jobs held by drilling Reservists. An understanding of the active Navy's reliance on the Naval Reserve to perform its daily operations is critical for TAR officers. Interviewees add that TAR officers need to understand how each of the two organizations--the regular Navy and the Naval Reserve--work in order to understand how they interact.

The need for this type of competency depends on each TAR officer's job and command. Junior aviation TAR officers on an operational squadron career track have less incentive to understand the overall active-Reserve relationship than do TAR officers at higher ranks or junior TAR officers who anticipate Reserve administrations tours. Officer C describes this knowledge needed for TAR officers.

It boils down to us [TARs] having an understanding how the regular Navy works and how we work and how that's all put together. How do we interface our squadrons in the fleet while on deployments? How do we interface all of our equipment needs with the active duty equipment needs? ...We kind of dump all that on the RLOs' laps for them to sort out [but] it depends on the quality of the RLOs. In some places it works great [to rely on the RLO] and other places we've not got much visibility there [with the active Navy] whatsoever... A general understanding of all that [relationship with active Navy] is good but again, I just picture myself back in the squadron as the operations officer. I could have cared less about all that stuff at the 0-4 level. But at this level right now, or even at the 0-5 level [it is important]. They [TARs] need to have a better understanding of that [relationship].

It is also considered critical for TAR officers to understand the many, distinct differences between the Naval Reserve and the active Navy. For instance, there are constraints on the length of time that most drilling Reservists can serve on active duty;

most serve only one weekend a month and two weeks a year, often prohibiting them from participation in lengthy schools and training pipelines available to their active duty counterparts. This constraint can restrict some Reservists from certain qualifications. Other differences between the Naval Reserve and the active Navy exist in the areas of readiness measurement, pay systems, types of orders and demographics –specifically, how close sailors’ residences are to the gaining command. Training and Administration of Reserve officers can help make the gaining commands and CINCs aware of what needs Reservists can and cannot fill for them and how their Reserve assets can best be utilized. As Officer D illustrates, fostering a flow of information between the drilling Reservists and the active Navy is an important role for TAR officers.

For whatever reason, a lot of TARs are hesitant to engage in conversations and relationships with gaining commands on behalf of their Reserve units. They feel like they [gaining commands] are outside of their sphere of influence. We need to overcome that.... Every TAR should feel confident that they could represent themselves as a Reserve subject matter expert to a gaining command.... They should feel confident that they could call up an RLO and talk about the issues [to relay information to] their unit COs... to empower the unit COs and provide them with the information they need to be technically accurate when they’re talking to the gaining command.... We have too many situations where the unit COs go... marching off smartly to the gaining command, fully well intentioned to do great things for the gaining command, but operating outside the balance of what the Naval Reserve Force can do, because nobody told them back at the Reserve center what our capabilities are.... They’re writing checks that the Naval Reserve can’t cash. And I think that’s very largely due to the fact that our full-time support cadre—the TAR officers - are not... schooling them up and giving them the information they need to know... A center CO [should have] the ability to reach out and touch the gaining command of each of the Reserve units that he or she supports at the Reserve center...

The importance of TAR officers fostering a relationship with gaining commands and CINCs is particularly critical in the area of manpower. The active Navy, based on its understanding of what resources the Reserves can offer, purchases and creates Reserve billets and units. Interviewees stress that TAR officers need to know that the active Navy’s operational plans (OPLANS) drive manpower requirements, including requirements for Reservists. The active Navy largely relies on TAR officers to communicate to it the value of Reserve assets; failure to properly present the value of the

Reserve force to the active Navy, as described by one interviewees, can cause the active Navy to make poorly informed decisions – decisions that could result in the dismantling of Reserve billets and units – which can threaten the existence of Naval Reserve ships and squadrons. Officer N expresses concern over the fact that many TAR officers do not properly understand the relationship between the active and Reserve Navy.

How does the interrelationship [between active and Reserve Navy] work? I've been in the program for 20 plus years and nobody's really ever sat down and explained it to me... All TAR officers really ought to understand how the entire picture works, how the individual relates to the unit, the unit relates to the gaining command, and the gaining command relates to the Navy or the sponsor.

Interviewees feel that this broad-based competency should include a general cognizance of the organizational structures of the U.S. Navy and the Department of Defense. In particular, TAR officers in command positions of geographically dispersed Reserve activities need to be aware of the U.S. Navy and other military hierarchy and authority in their regions, in addition to the chain of command internal to the Naval Reserve. Officer H states the importance of this knowledge.

Our TARS, because generally they're junior when we get them, don't understand the Navy hierarchy, how the chain of command works, the regional areas. They just don't have the breadth and depth of knowledge that they need to find out "who's who in the zoo." When you...have a Reserve Center [on a Navy base]...and you have... flag officers over there... you have to figure out where they fit into organization and who's doing what. ... In many cases you're the only Reserve presence. Now that's within the Navy. Say you go to some joint base that the Air Force is in charge of...you have to figure out that organizational structure [as well as] the Navy's organization – the echelons, CINCS, the administrative side, regionalization...

By the time they reach more senior levels, TAR officers also need to have a general understanding of the offices within the Chief of Naval Operations organization (OPNAV) and those offices within the DoD organization that impact the Reserve organization. Officer F stresses that an awareness of the role of pertinent offices and organizational levels within the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and OPNAV, and an understanding of how these offices interact, was valuable during a TAR tour at the Pentagon.

An understanding of the Naval Reserve organization is considered a required TAR officer competency. However, interviewees are concerned that TAR officers, in general, do not have a fundamental understanding of the Naval Reserve Force. Officer P summarizes this TAR officer competency as knowing “the relationship between the Naval Reserve, the big Navy, and the Hill.” This officer explained that when a TAR officer is assigned a task by the immediate supervisory command, he or she should try to understand the higher-level interest or impact of the task, as might have been initiated by an activity many levels higher than the immediately superior level. Such an understanding can help TAR officers realize the different pressures and obligations of their immediate and higher-level bosses and better understand the reasons behind projects and tasks. As stressed by Officer P, as well as other interviewees, TAR officers should develop an ability to “know the big picture beyond your command.”

3. Understanding Manpower Processes

Almost all of the officers interviewed consider knowledge of manpower processes to be an essential TAR officer competency. This competency is quite broad and includes both macro and micro dimensions. As many interviewees state, the Naval Reserve is basically a manpower pool for the active Navy. The creation and management of billets as well as the supply of personnel to fill these billets, is, in essence, the subject matter of manpower.

Understanding the Reserve billet creation process, as explained by interviewees, is a critical part of this competency. Reserve billets are based on operational requirements identified by the active Navy. The genesis of requirements for a command’s billets is a document called the Required Operational Capability and Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE) or its shore command counterpart, the Mission, Functions and Tasks Statement (MFT). From these source documents, manpower requirements are determined and, if these requirements are funded, actual billets are authorized, as presented in the Activity Manpower Document (AMD).

Key concepts for TAR officers to understand from this billet creation process are that the active Navy’s operational mission and requirements drive billet creation and that these requirements only become actual billets if they are funded. Interviewees stress that TAR officers may find that both the active duty gaining commands and the drilling

Reservists do not know the billet creation process. As illustrated by several interviewees, it is not unusual for drilling Reservists to tell TAR officers at their Reserve center that the gaining command has requested that the Naval Reserve create a new billet in a specific Reserve unit. The officers interviewed stress that TAR officers know that, since the active duty gaining command is the organization that holds the AMD, it, rather than the Naval Reserve, holds the key to creating a billet. In this context, Officer A describes the manpower knowledge needed by TAR officers.

A basic understanding of AMDs and how they are developed is probably useful for every senior TAR officer. But, because we are essentially a manpower pool, I think there is an awful lot of basic manpower knowledge that every TAR should have. I think at the very junior level they probably don't need to know the AMD, but they do need to understand "no funding, no billet; no billet, no body." New Orleans doesn't own the funding and doesn't write the billets. We are the facilitators to help point you to the right people to help you manage this thing.

Senior TAR officers or TAR officers assigned to staff billets involving manpower need to have a more detailed understanding of this process. This level of understanding should include familiarity with the roles of two key players in the manpower processes--resource sponsors and claimants; claimants decide which requirements should get funded, and resource sponsors decide how much funding will be provided to cover these requirements. The detailed level of this competency also includes an awareness of the role of an important manpower information system called the Total Force Manpower Management System (TFMMS). It is not expected that TAR officers possess the detailed knowledge of a system operator, as they are not expected to manipulate the system; rather TAR officers should be aware of what information is contained and managed in this system. Officer O indicates that TAR officers in the ranks of 0-5 and 0-6, as well as TAR RLOs, need to understand processes at a rather advanced level. This interviewee also includes knowledge of the role that operational plans (OPLANS) and Shore Manpower Requirements Determination Programs (SMRDPs) play in manpower processes. The fundamental manpower knowledge for senior TAR officers should also include a familiarity with the contents of the primary manpower instruction, OPNAVINST 1001.16J. Officer O feels that the manpower competency required for junior TAR

officers, at the O-3 and O-4 level, generally need only include an understanding of the role of gaining commands and CINCs in the billet creation process and an awareness that resource sponsors “pay” for Reserve billets.

Officer U, a TAR aviator, indicates that, while TAR aviators who are not in the Reserve administration career track have very little interest in learning the manpower processes, every TAR officer needs to know at least the basic manpower fundamentals. Below, Officer D indicates that a fundamental knowledge of manpower should be required of all TAR officers who personally interact with drilling Reservists, such as TAR officers who run RESCENS and NARs.

When [TARs interact] with our SELRES, say...at the Echelon V level, a center CO should be fully capable of talking about Manpower 101: how a billet is created, structured, resourced; who does the resourcing; have a basic familiarity with who the resource sponsors are. That's something a lot of times we [TAR officers] don't get until we get into this building [Reserve headquarters]. But a TAR Officer needs to know it.

In general, interviewees indicate that they personally were not exposed to the manpower process until they were assigned to a staff tour. Both the Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO) course and the Reserve Liaison Officer (RLO) course, offered by the Naval Reserve Professional Development Center (NAVRESPROFDEVVCEN), currently include an overview of manpower processes; however, not all officers are eligible to or required to attend either course. Interviewees acknowledge that there is a significantly inconsistent level of fundamental manpower knowledge among the senior TAR population. In fact, many interviewees indicate that, many TAR senior officers, as well nearly all TAR junior officers, are overall fairly naïve about the manpower processes. The general weakness in this competency area seems to have made manpower a subject of mystery among many TAR officers, as is expressed by Officer M.

Most definitely, manpower [is a required competency]. How the Navy's manpower works is a core competency that most TARS don't have...most TARS don't know [manpower]. They don't care to know it....

[Manpower] is extremely important. Because once you crack that code you become like the wizard on the top of the mountain. Everyone comes to you and says, “Can you do this for me?” or “Can you do that for me?”,

and it's only because you know how to make things happen. In other words, you're finding out that the more you learn about it, the more you can make things happen. Or you could just as easily say "No, that's impossible. That will never happen." [Manpower processes] are not evident to people who don't know what's behind the curtain.

In fact, manpower is considered by Officer N to be the most misunderstood area of Naval Reserve management. In addition, there is a perceived level of resistance among TAR officers to learn manpower processes. Officer P conjectures on this perception.

[Reserve] training is something everyone can learn and wing it. But Naval Reserve manpower systems are complicated and people like to say, "it's not understandable." People are spooked by manpower and kept ignorant. "It's all smoke and mirrors" is a common comment by TARs. People refuse to learn the complicated system, but you do not see the same resistance to learning training.

The processes referred to as "the personnel side" of the manpower system include processes to manage the assignment of people into authorized billets. Nearly every TAR officer, in his or her TAR career, will be involved with the management of Reserve personnel assignments. Interviewees indicate that all TAR officers need to acquire a basic understanding of how to match people with billets, the personnel side, as well as a very basic understanding of where billets and units come from, the macro manpower side. The micro-level aspect of the manpower competency requires an in-depth understanding of the Reserve Unit Assignment Document (RUAD), as well as with Reserve Area Functional Area and Sex codes (RFASs), which describe the requirements for each billet. Officer A describes important knowledge on the micro or personnel side.

[TAR officers need to know about] matching people to billets in the context of what the billet requires. Keep remembering, gang, we [Naval Reserve] didn't make that [billet requirements] up. They came from the fleet ...and represent our part of a [active duty] mission someplace...Basic concepts for the people involved with personnel management [include answering] "Why can't I change the substitution codes so it's easier for me to fill the billet?" The objective isn't to put everybody in billets. The objective is to meet the mission. ... Tie what you do back to the big picture.

In nearly all of the interviews, officers indicate that TAR officers must have a basic familiarity with manpower processes. For junior officers, fundamentals of this competency include an ability to manage Reserve personnel assignments, along with a general awareness of the macro-level of manpower. More senior TAR officers and those in staff commands should have greater fluency in macro-level manpower processes. Interviewees, in general, feel that there is a deficiency in this competency among TAR officers at all levels.

4. Expertise to be a Commanding Officer

About a third of the officers interviewed in this study feel that the expertise required to be a commanding officer (CO) is a fundamental TAR officer competency. In the regular Navy, officers typically do not assume the position of CO until they have reached the rank of commander, if not captain. The likelihood of assuming command much earlier in a TAR officer's career is a fundamental difference between the two officer communities. Junior TAR officers belonging to the surface side of the Naval Reserve, which, as explained in the Background chapter, includes officers in the surface warfare, submarine, special warfare, and fleet support communities, are routinely assigned to be a CO of a RESCEN. Reserve Centers are often not situated on or near a U.S. Navy base, nor near a REDCOM, their next superior in the chain of command. Officers serving as RESCEN COs are therefore often isolated from personal contact with, and support from, peers and superior officers. The independent officer duty aspect of such a tour adds to the challenge of being a CO.

TAR officers on the aviation side of the Naval Reserve assume command at roughly the same career phase as those in the regular Navy. However, aviation TAR junior officers on the Reserve management track, rather than the squadron track, share a unique leadership challenge with junior officers on the surface side; these TAR junior officers must manage and direct Reserve units, as well as the unit COs who often are much more senior in rank than they.

Hence, surface TAR officers, and to a lesser extent, aviation TAR officers, can be placed in command positions requiring leadership skills well before such responsibilities are given to officers in the regular Navy--and well before training commensurate with these responsibilities is offered. In one interview, Officer J expresses this view.

Once you're a CO, you own the farm. Unlike the active Navy's ramp up [leadership training at for junior, mid-level and senior officers] you [TARs] don't necessarily have the same milestones, so you may be really, really junior and have all the requirements immediately laid on your plate, with a maturity [requirement] that you wouldn't expect until many years down the road.

This view was voiced by many of the interviewees. The active Navy's "ramp up," to which Officer J referred, is a series of leadership courses called the Leadership Continuum. This leadership development program consists of typically two-week courses, which an active duty officer attends – one as a fairly junior officer, a second during the mid-grade phase, and a third at the senior officer level. The junior officer leadership course is geared towards developing skills needed to perform as a department head – the typical job held by a junior officer. Junior officers in the TAR program, however, already face CO responsibilities while their regular Navy peers are department heads. In addition, the TAR CO faces Reserve-specific challenges, such as professionally managing and directing drilling Reservists who hold senior officer ranks. The point made by Officer J and others is that the regular Navy Leadership Continuum is not customized to fit the unique command leadership development needs of TAR officers. Officer N further explains this opinion.

TAR officers, probably earlier than USN officers, need to have some leadership management training above and beyond what they get in their officer basic training...[such as training for] junior officers who work with senior officers - some type of indoctrination or training. I know we're all getting leadership training now-a-days but maybe Reserve-specific leadership training to cover the Reserve unit aspect of management.

Leadership skills are but one ingredient to the many and broad abilities required to be a CO. Officer T offers a flavor for the spectrum of requirements for TAR COs.

Those officers who are going to be COs need to know how you handle facilities, how you handle the media, how you relate with your community, how you deal with your senior leadership, what do you do about environmental issues, legal issues...[these] are important if you're going to be a CO.

The many TAR officers who assume command of a RESCEN face a plethora of challenges normally faced by regular Navy officers in a much more senior rank, who

have developed a more seasoned, mature awareness and ability to handle responsibilities. Interviewees expressed particular concern about the “people skills” requirement for TAR officers. Unlike some knowledge-type requirements, such as knowledge of the Navy legal system, the ability to interact professionally in an articulate, mature manner is not considered solely a schoolroom-taught skill; rather is considered to be an ability that one develops through experience. Yet, such skills are required of TAR officers in leadership positions, as is expressed below by Officer Q.

A lot of the jobs you have as a TAR out in the field [involve] understanding how to deal with people... To become a TAR and be a CO right off the bat at an echelon five command [requires] that that individual have independent duty skills and that's not something that you can teach.

Other areas of required expertise offered by the interviewees include a firm understanding of the Navy’s many personnel policies, including policies on sexual harassment and fraternization; the naval legal system and of the UCMJ; the Navy’s personnel advancement system, both for officers and for enlisted personnel; public relations; communications skills; core values; facilities management, and the presently critical area of force protection. Many of these topics are covered in the regular Navy officer leadership course designed for senior officers who are assuming command for the first time. This course, no doubt, contains some, albeit not all, training appropriate for TAR junior officers who are assuming command. However, the TAR junior officers are only eligible to take a course at the junior officer level, which has less emphasis on development of commanding officer skills. The NAVRESPROFDEVVCEN PCO course offers some exposure to these general CO skills, but, due largely to time constraints, cannot cover them in the depth or breadth covered by the regular Navy CO-oriented course. Officer K describes some command and leadership challenges facing the prospective TAR CO.

The people skills that you don’t understand will get you killed ... So you better have some understanding of the Navy policies - not just Reserve, [but also] sexual harassment, that entire thing. You need to develop an awareness...a level of self-protection ... all this good stuff [preparation] happens at the leadership [training program] in the regular Navy, but is often restricted to those who are going to their first command in the regular Navy, which is like ships and stuff. So they get all this really neat training. If you’re a Junior TAR you don’t go to that school.

In addition to the commanding officer requirements described above, TAR officers in command positions need a big picture understanding of the interrelationships between each of the functions at their command. Enlisted TAR personnel are assigned to specific, functional areas or departments at Reserve activities, such as supply, medical, training and personnel. The enlisted personnel's knowledge and skills are, in general, stove piped; individuals are trained to be proficient in their assigned duty, but not in the duties of personnel assigned to other areas. The CO, as the command leader, should have a general knowledge of all functional areas; he or she must understand how each area is interrelated to and impacts the others and how, together, the sum effort of each of the functional areas produce mobilization-ready Reservists. Officer S explains the need for TAR officers to have this broad-based expertise.

Training, NSIPS, order writing, etc. tie together at some point. Somebody has got to have a working knowledge of all of that, and the CO should have the working knowledge of all of it. Because the enlisted guy that's in the NSIPS shop isn't going to know order writing. And the guy in the training department isn't going to know NSIPS.

The need for TAR officers to possess the expertise required to be a commanding officer was voiced more often in interviews with surface TAR officers than with those on the aviation side. Yet, while surface TAR junior officers are more likely than their aviation peers to fill independent-duty CO billets, all TAR officers share the challenges of managing Reserve officers who are senior in rank to them and of leading a sizable active duty TAR enlisted staff.

5. Understanding the Mobilization Process

Approximately one third of the interviewees included an understanding of the mobilization process as a TAR officer core competency. As stated in U.S. Code Title 10, the mission of the Naval Reserve is, "to provide trained units and qualified personnel to be available for active duty in the Naval Forces, in time of war or national emergency, or when otherwise authorized by law." Overall, the interviewees feel that knowledge of mobilization should be recognized as a rather obvious required competency, since mobilization is the very core of the Naval Reserve business and is the primary cause for the organization's existence.

The interviewees feel that all TAR officers must have an overall understanding of the steps in the mobilization process – from start to finish. Officer B describes this need.

First you need to know the flow of how things happen...from a broad aspect of how someone gets mobilized...how the CINC gets somebody mobilized ... we should know how it works at least from a broad aspect.

Guidance for the mobilization process is found in several U.S. Navy governing directives; COMNAVRESFOR has several key implementing directives, and, in turn, lower-level echelons each have their own mobilization directives specific to their activity. The process begins with a decision to increase the number of personnel on active duty to better meet operational requirements; this decision is initiated at high levels within the DoD. As described by Officer K, it is the requirement for additional manpower to the regular Navy that determines if the need is a Reserve or active requirement. If determined to be a Reserve requirement, it is forwarded to the Naval Reserve, which creates orders to recall specifically identified individuals who can satisfy the requirement.

TAR officers are involved in this process at various stages: officers at high echelon commands may identify or advertise for Reservists who can meet the designated needs; mid-level echelon staffs pass needs to field activities, assist in and oversee mobilization processing, and ensure year-round that subordinate field activities are maintaining a high “readiness” levels; lower level echelons are the first on-site mobilization processing site for the recalled Reservists and ensure that the drilling Reservists assigned to their command meet specific training, medical and other mobilization requirements. At various echelon levels, TAR officers track the status of recalled Reservists throughout the entire process, until the Reservists are demobilized and released from active duty. In his interview, Officer S describes how critical it is for TAR officers to understand the mobilization process.

One of the big reasons we're in business is to provide a mobilization force. It's not the only reason, because we now do peacetime support. But where the rubber meets the road is mobilization. And where you haven't done those things at your center to have your people mobilizable, then there're not going to be able to go.

The interviewees indicate that TAR officers should have an overall familiarity with the entire mobilization process. While a broad understanding of the entire process is

essential, a particularly detailed level of knowledge of the mobilization process at one's activity is also required. The level of detail that a TAR officer must know about this process depends on his or her current billet and command. For instance, officers at low-echelon level Reserve activities, which perform specific, designated steps in the mobilization process, need not have as detailed an understanding of the entire process as might those officers at the higher-echelon commands that actually write mobilization policy. Officer S describes how the depth of this competency can depend on to what echelon level a TAR officer is assigned.

[The mobilization process] needs to be known, obviously, at different levels. Somebody who is in a squadron or somebody who is at echelon IV, or even at a NAS, they probably don't need to know nearly as much if you were working at OPNAV or were working here at COMNAVRESFOR. I guess there are different levels of expertise because your responsibility at the echelon V level is [to comply with] the message to mobilize these people.... you don't make a whole lot of mobilization policy.

Similarly, TAR officers at a field-level activity, such as a Reserve center, are expected to have a very in-depth understanding of their specific role in the mobilization process. Officer S further describes the level of detailed knowledge required of Reserve Center TAR officers.

For mobilization, understand whole process overall, and the detailed part is your part in preparing them for mobilization. Once you [the Reserve center] get orders to mobilize and send the [Reservists] on their way, then the next step of it [process] they get at their next station. But you should be able to brief them on what they'll get at the next steps, so you should have a working knowledge of that [other steps in the process].

The interviewees indicate that TAR officers, overall, exhibit a significant gap in this competency area, as they do not adequately understand the entire mobilization process. While TAR officers may know the specific steps that they or their immediate command must take during a mobilization, they, overall, lack a comprehensive understanding of the entire process. There also is concern that TAR officers have some confusion regarding the steps they or their command must perform in the mobilization process. Officer G describes this competency gap.

The whole mobilization process [is what] you need to understand ...the unit level process through the total institutional process. I don't think we [TAR officers] really institutionally understand mobilization. We tell [field level TARs] people by message to mobilize somebody and ... some of them do a good job of taking care of Reservists others just kind of send them on their merry way and hope everything works out. I mean that's why we're here.

There is a perception that many TAR officers at a field-level, Reserve center activity may have a myopic view of the process; they perform their specific role in the process, without knowing what other steps are performed beyond their immediate horizon. Responsibilities of higher echelons include selecting the type of mobilization orders that will be sent to the field activities. In doing so, they must be cognizant of the travel and family entitlement repercussions of different types of orders; use of orders inappropriate for the situation at hand can have a serious impact on a Reservist's family. Responsibilities of field-level commands include the ability to electronically receive individual orders sent by the higher levels and to enter the appropriate codes into the electronic mobilization tracking system. At each level, TAR officers need to consider the impact and repercussions of their role in the entire mobilization system. Officer B describes the perceived myopic vision of the mobilization process by TAR officers at different echelon levels.

The center [only] partially understands what happens in mobilization...[not larger perspective aspects like]...How are orders generated? What do they actually mean? What are the benefits to the family? Are they entitled to the same thing the active components are entitled to? For instance, at the beginning of Noble Eagle, we should have been asking "Are the [appropriate] orders TAD orders? What's the difference between TAD orders and PCS orders?" The difference is that at 140 days, every single order becomes PCS from an entitlement perspective. At 180 days, every single order is a PCS order, unless the Secretary says it's not...These are fundamental answers that we should know to take care of our SELRES. Why didn't we [TAR officers] drive that [proper selection of order type] initially to make it happen? Because we paid lip service to knowledge. Because we did not think of the impact. What happens in mobilization besides the mechanics...Every TAR should know how to mobilize.

Interviewees also voiced concern that, even at the local level, TAR officers do not adequately understand the exact steps their activity must perform in the mobilization process. Officer S feels that TAR officers, in general, do not understand mobilization.

Nobody understands mobilization. Even the guys over here [COMNAVRESFOR] that do it don't understand until they have to it. Maybe the guy that runs the [COMNAVRESFOR] Mob Cell understands it day to day, but nobody else understands mobilization. I ran a RESCEN and we had all that stuff [mobilization instructions] locked away in a safe, but nobody understood what was going on with it. We still had to call REDCOM or Surface, and they would still need to call somebody to get the details.

Overall, the interviewees feel that TAR officers should have a general understanding of the entire mobilization process and of the impact each step has on the other steps in the process. This competency should include an intricate knowledge of the process performed at one's own activity. Interviewees also feel that there is a gap between what TAR officers should understand regarding the mobilization process and what they currently actually understand.

6. Ability to Use or Manipulate Information Systems

Training and Administration of Reserve officers must interact directly or indirectly with numerous information systems (IS). About half of the interviewees feel that all TAR officers need to have a general understanding of the information systems that impact the Naval Reserve. Some systems are manipulated by operators solely at Reserve field-level activities, some just at mid-echelon activities, some only at high echelon Reserve or U.S. Navy activities, and some at all Naval Reserve activities. In addition, each TAR officer's direct contact or responsibility with many systems may range between extensive or non-existent, depending on the officer's rank and assigned billet. Regardless of where the actual operator manipulations occur, all of the corporate systems mentioned by the interview participants in some way impact Naval Reserve activities and personnel at all levels.

The list below provides a brief definition of the systems mentioned by interview participants.

RSTARS (Reserve Standard Training Administration and Readiness Support) - A system used to manage manpower and personnel data for drilling Reservists that tracks training and medical requirements and accomplishments.

NOW (New Order Writing) - A relatively new system that writes AT/ADT/IDTT orders.

TFMMS (Total Force Manpower Management System) – A U.S. Navy system that serves as the source of Navy manpower data; it tracks manpower requirements, authorizations, and resources.

RUAD (Reserve Unit Assignment Document) – An electronically generated document that lists the billets and drilling Reservists assigned to a Reserve unit.

RHS (Reserve Headquarters System) - Provides management-level summary data on manpower, personnel, and training to upper echelon managers.

IMAPMIS (Inactive Manpower and Personnel Management Information System) – A system maintained by Naval Reserve Personnel Command that contains personal data for every member of the Naval Reserve who is not on active duty. The system transmits to the DoD finance center for pay purposes.

NSIPS (Navy Standard Integrated Personnel System) - A system that contains personnel and pay data and provides input for IMAPMIS and RHS.

RTSS (Reserve Training Support System) – A system controlled by RHS and used by echelon IV commands. NSIPS transmits to RTSS; RTSS transmits to IMAPMIS.

FASTDATA (Fund Administration and Standard Document Automation) – A system used by Supply personnel to manage and track a command's Operating Target (OPTAR) funds.

Excel, Access, PowerPoint – Commercial-off-the-shelf personal computer systems that are used by many TAR officers to manage and present information.

Nearly every aspect of the Naval Reserve is managed in some fashion by a corporate information system – including management of Reserve training, orders, pay,

medical benefits, and uniforms. The U.S. Navy and Naval Reserve corporate information systems are not self-contained, closed systems; rather, they are interconnected to other systems. Often one system feeds data into another system within the Navy or DoD system. Hence, the impact of one activity's input into a system can have a far-reaching effect on the Naval Reserve. Interviewees feel that it is essential that TAR officers have an understanding of the general purpose of these systems, as well as of the data-flow process. Officer Q describes this need.

[TAR officers need] a good working knowledge of the corporate information systems...all the legacy systems that we have ...NSIPS is a big one right now... RHS, RSTARS.... Just have a general working knowledge of what they do and if they have a problem with something, know which system it is.

Interviewees feel that TAR officers should not operate in a vacuum, or with a myopic mindset regarding these systems. Due to the high level of dependency and interaction across the Naval Reserve systems, interviewees feel that TAR officers, as general managers for the Naval Reserve, must at least understand the general processes and interactions of many key systems. Officer A affirms the need for this big picture level of understanding.

[TAR officers should understand] TFMMS, RHS, Not how to manipulate them, but understand what information systems are available...And [know] the kind of information that exists in there, because a lot of people try to create a new database when there's actually one that already exists...so the broader objective of knowing this information exists and who I can go to, to get it. Because we're supposed to be the Reserve consultants for active Navy. It means you have to have kind of inkling that it [a system] does exist and who owns the system.

Not only is it considered important for TAR officers to have expertise in Navy-specific systems, but also to have general personal computer skills. One interviewee stresses that TAR officers must possess personal computer skills sufficient to create spreadsheets and to conduct quantitative data analysis, in addition to possessing the ability to work with the Reserve-related computer systems that TAR officers need to monitor and evaluate information at their command. It is also advised that TAR officers be able to use the same systems that they expect their drilling Reservists to use.

Interviewees agree that in addition to having a fairly detailed level of understanding of systems operated at one's own activity level, TAR officers need at least a general understanding of all Naval Reserve-related corporate systems that are not manipulated at one's own activity level. For example, TAR officers at the Reserve center level should have a strong knowledge of systems manipulated at their level, such as NSIPS and FASTDATA. However, at this level, TAR officers need only have a very general understanding of the role and function of systems like RHS and IMAPMIS – systems that are manipulated at mid- and high-levels, respectively. Officer F explains that the level of detailed knowledge required by TAR officers is contingent upon their rank and specific job responsibilities.

An area that they [TARs] should have some knowledge in--not necessarily having to sit down and do functions and the actual keystrokes for--is NSIPS... They should be familiar with the [information] systems to know what they're capable of... we're back to what level we're talking at...At a center CO level for a lieutenant or lieutenant commander, I don't see a need to understand RHS or IMAPMIS or those types of systems. [Rather, just] the ones that is critical to them at their command.

All interviewees do not share the above opinion that, even at the Reserve center level, TAR officers do not require an operator-level knowledge of NSIPS. The actual NSIPS operator at a Reserve activity is an enlisted person. Typically, after data entry is conducted, a senior enlisted person and/or an officer review management reports generated by NSIPS. It is considered valuable for the commanding officer to have sufficient expertise in NSIPS to be able to provide oversight to the NSIPS processes conducted by the enlisted staff. The Naval Reserve Professional Development Center (NAVRESPROFDEVVCEN) exposes officers to NSIPS in its PCO course, while the operator-level mechanics of the system are taught in the Reserve Pay and Personnel Management Course, which primarily enlisted personnel attend. Officer S expresses the concern that TAR officers may prefer to let their enlisted staff alone have the operator knowledge of system, while perhaps TAR officers should also have fluency in such systems.

I hate to say it, but officers should be involved in NSIPS and understand how it works and be able to get in there and check on information and not just have your E-5 operator know it. You need to have the officer

involved as well, so there are checks and balances. [NAVRESPROFDEVVCEN] does NSIPS familiarization, but [they] hardly do any training for officers on NSIPS.

Thus, there is a difference of opinion among interviewees regarding the level of detailed knowledge TAR officers need to possess of NSIPS. An interviewee who is a TAR aviator indicates that TAR officers on the squadron career track have little need to have even a general familiarity with systems not operated at their activity, such as the RHS and RTSS systems, while TAR aviation officers on the Reserve management track, who are typically assigned to NARs and NARCENS, should have a general familiarity with these systems and with NSIPS.

All interviewees who consider knowledge of IS to be a TAR officer competency also feel that there is a gap between the level of IS knowledge TAR officers currently possess and the desired level. There is a sense that TAR officers are only familiar with the systems with which they are directly involved. The general feeling is that TAR officers lack broad exposure and understanding to systems beyond their immediate job horizon, despite the significant impact these somewhat less visible systems might have on one's command and the Reservists it supports. In his interview, Officer M expresses this concern.

Most of the TAR Officers I know have very limited knowledge of RESFOR Systems. They only know what they have to know in order to get by. I'm talking about IT Systems like RHS, IMAPMIS, RSTARS, NOW. More importantly, they lack a depth of understanding about what those systems are trying to do.

Training and Administration of Reserve officers can expand their problem-solving capabilities with an understanding of what information is managed by the corporate information systems. However, there is concern among interviewees that many TAR officers often lack sufficient expertise in Reserve systems to manipulate a system, as needed, to solve problems. Officer S describes the perceived gap in the IS competency area and the need for additional training.

TAR officers need a better understanding of IT. We assume that the average TAR officer has a working knowledge of IT, but that's not necessarily true. Especially for the smaller RESCENS where you have five to six people [on full-time enlisted staff] so a lot of times, they

[enlisted staff] rely on that CO. So somewhere in that [training] pipeline we need to put in some IT training. Or, better to say, maintain that proficiency. Everybody knows how to turn that computer on, but changes are happening so fast these days, that the [TAR officers] need to maintain that proficiency somehow.

Overall, the interviewees feel that TAR officers must have a broad, working knowledge of the corporate Reserve-related information systems – both those at their own command level and those at other levels within the Reserve organization. It is also necessary for TAR officers to have a more detailed knowledge of systems that operate within their own activity, perhaps as detailed as an operator-level ability, particularly at smaller Reserve activities. There is a perceived gap between the knowledge and proficiency that TAR officers currently possess regarding information systems, and the knowledge and proficiency that they ought to possess.

7. Understanding Financial Processes Applicable to Your Job

An understanding of financial processes applicable to one's job or level is considered a TAR officer competency by about half of the officers interviewed. Interviewees describe this competency as having both a macro level and a micro level. The macro level involves understanding the processes by which Naval Reserve obtains its funding and how different types of funding are allocated. A general understanding of the macro level is considered useful for TAR officers at all echelons and in all stages of their TAR careers, but is considered particularly critical for TARs who are senior officers or who are in billets at major staff commands. The micro level of this competency includes Reserve-specific funding and financial processes; such expertise is considered essential for all TAR officers in Reserve management tours.

Interviewees feel that a macro-level understanding of financial processes includes familiarity with military appropriations, the budget process, different funding types, and how money flows from the defense budget to fund Naval Reserve operations. It is important for TAR officers to be aware of how the Naval Reserve and U.S. Navy budget is allocated for different expenditures, including funding for different types of training (AT, ADT, ADSW), equipment (aircraft equipment, facilities), and day-to-day operating expenses of the Reserve activities. That is, the macro-level understanding of finance includes the funding flow process all the way from the level of military appropriations in

the defense budget, to the Naval Reserve Force, to the Reserve field or operational level. Interviewees feel that TAR officers should understand that there are two key types of funding – Operation and Maintenance, Naval Reserve (OM&NR) and Reserve Personnel, Navy (RPN) – and that each type funds different of expenses for the Reserve force. The two “colors of money” are not interchangeable; expenses allowed under one type of funding cannot be paid for from the other type’s pot of money. The interviewees feel that an overall understanding of the macro-level process helps TAR officers understand the organization, levels, and constraints facing their command’s resources. Officer H expresses the need for TAR officers to have a general exposure to this macro-level picture of Reserve money.

I think to be effective at any level as a TAR officer, you have to know where your funding comes from and how funding works.... [at the level of] a REDCOM or NAR...[TARs should] know how that money flows to the point of knowing what appropriations there are and what that money does. At the REDCOM or even at the staff level...[TARs should know] how you get your money and how you spend it... all the way from D.C., where you’re talking congressional appropriations, all the way down to the storekeeper on the deck using a credit card to pay for something.

Interviewees feel that the level of detail required in this competency varies depending on one’s rank and tour assignment. At the lower echelon levels, TAR officers need only a broad exposure to the funding process; they should know of the differences between the two key types of funding and how AT and ADT dollars are managed. But, it is felt that an understanding of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) processes are not required until one reaches a major staff tour, which typically is at the senior officer level. At this senior level, TAR officers are expected to know the processes of obtaining funding for a program. Officer F describes the level of detail needed at this level.

When you reach that level [senior officer], you need to have at least a basic, if not a working, knowledge of the PBBS system. Because whatever assignment you’re in up there [in the Pentagon], my experience is that someone’s going to be talking about the POM and the PR ... And to be effective we go back to, no matter what great initiative you have, if there’s no funding, it [the program] is not going anywhere.

It is felt that much of the macro-level knowledge is obtained by TAR officers through on-the-job exposure, rather than by formal training. Hence, there is a markedly inconsistent level of understanding of this macro picture of Reserve money among the TAR officer community. Officer D is concerned about a gap of knowledge among TAR officers in this competency area, adding that a general macro-level knowledge of Naval Reserve funding is critical, not only for better understanding of one's own activity's operations, but also to help develop confidence among drilling Reservists that TAR officers are knowledgeable about the Naval Reserve.

I think that a lot of TARs... don't understand the difference between RPN and O&M, NR funding. What is covered under each of these? There are two different types of funding, two different colors of money. We don't have a good feel for what one type pays for versus another. When you get out to a Reserve center or a REDCOM, you need to be able to speak that language. And the first time you speak it incorrectly and look ignorant, you are ignorant and it gives away credibility. So the next time you go to talk that same person and they think, "Well, they got it wrong last time, what he is going to say this time?"

The gap in this competency, like that in many other competency areas, is largely attributed to the fact that most TAR officers only gain a macro-level understanding of finance when they are in a job that requires this knowledge – that is, through on-the-job training. Formal training in this area is included in the NAVRESPROFDEVVCEN Reserve Liaison Officer (RLO) course. However, many TAR officers are not offered this course, and, as Officer O describes, coverage of this topic is considered more of a "shotgun affect," rather than in-depth.

Macro-level finance topics are also covered in the Naval War College's Joint Professional Military Education courses; such courses, however, are not taken by all TAR officers and the timing of a TAR officer taking such coursework may not coincide with his or her job assignment that requires this knowledge. Those TAR officers on the aviation side are most likely to lack exposure to the macro picture of Naval Reserve finance; since the majority of TAR aviators are assigned to the operations-focused RESFORONs, rather than to Reserve administration-focused NARs, they have less exposure and incentive to develop this competency. Officer G describes this phenomenon.

What little I learned about the financial end [in my earlier TAR career] was basically oriented towards flight hours and ...money to fly airplanes... I don't think anybody understands the POM process until they go to D.C. and [learn] that there is a POM process, that we plan and program and develop our finances in a short term and long term, with the short term as really nothing more than validating what you already established in the long-term process. You need to be exposed to that. The majority of the young officers, certainly aviators, do not want to [learn these processes]... [They need] exposure that there is a POM process, how it works, but not the intricacies. Just the fact that there is a process...it helps them understand the personnel piece if they understand the POM process a little bit. There is some logic to this. There is a process where we identify requirements that end up being billets that somebody buys which generates hiring a person, that there is a cost associated with that person. And that person's costs drive how many people we can have in the Navy... Most guys [TAR officers] don't understand this.

Overall, it is considered important for TAR officers at all levels to have a macro-level understanding how the Naval Reserve Forces obtains and uses its funding and for senior TAR officers to have a more detailed understanding of these processes. Interviewees indicate that there is inadequate across-the-board formal exposure to this macro-level competency.

The micro level of financial knowledge required by TAR officers largely reflects the expertise needed to manage financial responsibilities of an echelon IV or V activity, such as a NAR or a RESCEN. Financial competency at this level is considered very essential, as TAR officers have direct responsibility for the money managed and spent at their commands. In the regular Navy, most officers have limited direct financial management responsibilities. Typically the commands are of a large enough size to have a supply officer, who manages financial matters with the CO conducting oversight. However, due to the small active duty staff size of many Reserve activities, TAR officers often only have enlisted supply personnel and must directly manage the finances of their commands. The area of command financial management can offer risks if managed improperly. As Officer E states, "the thing that will get you in the biggest trouble the quickest is money."

A TAR officer who is a CO is responsible for management of the command's operating target budget (OPTAR), which, in essence, is like a checking account for much

of the command's business operations. He or she is also responsible for the command's Government Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC), which the enlisted storekeeper (SK) typically uses to charge purchases from commercial vendors. Both accounts require close management. The interviewees indicate that, despite the importance of these responsibilities, TAR officers often find that on-the-job learning, rather than formal instruction prior to assuming the responsibilities, is the primary learning method. The PCO course offered by NAVRESPROFDEVVCEN provides a broad-level exposure to these financial responsibilities, but, according to some interviewees, does not adequately equip TAR officers with the specific skills to manage their command's finances. Officer D elaborates on this opinion.

They [PCO course]... had like a half day on the Government Commercial Purchase Card monthly reconciliation [process]. Basic OPTAR Management... is not part of any training pipeline that any officer gets along the way, but is something that we all are expected to pick up at some point. I think, especially for our young TARS, lieutenants and young lieutenant commanders, we need to make sure they're equipped to be able to do that [OPTAR management] without losing anything along the way. Resources are precious and we can't afford to lose or abuse them. I think that's something we need to teach people.

In addition to the required abilities to manage the command's OPTAR, TAR officers should be well versed in the job responsibilities of their SK; supply personnel arrange for the berthing and messing of Reservists, often with use of commercial contracts; in addition, supply personnel provide uniforms for enlisted Reservists. The TAR officer in charge of a Reserve activity must have a detailed understanding of the SK's use of the government charge card and of any contracts established by the command. Officer H describes the broad financial responsibilities of a RESCEN or NAR CO.

You have the O&M, NR side--how you make your lights turn on and all the utilities, and then you have your personnel side, how you get your people paid, how you get them where they need to be, how the SELRES get their uniforms, how the SELRES are berthed and fed on the weekends; how the contracts set up... you need to understand...the mechanics on that stuff....what the SK is doing. A lot of people just rely on their SK and have absolutely no clue of what's going on.... They're blissfully ignorant the whole time they're out there and fortunately nothing happens to them, like their SK stealing money.

Another financial responsibility of TAR officers in a CO billet is management of the command's Government Travel Charge Card (GTCC) program. Coupled with the macro-level funding perspective, TAR officers at field-level Reserve activities must understand that the different types of orders they produce for their drilling Reservists, such as orders for IDTT, AT and ADT, each have different funding sources. In the past, field-level Reserve activities (RESCENs/NARs/NARCENs) were not required to manage funds for their drilling Reservists to perform AT. The recent decentralization of AT funds has imposed a relatively new, but very important, skill requirement for TAR officers in CO billets – management of AT funds. Overall, the interviewees feel that all TAR officers must have in-depth knowledge and abilities in command-level financial management.

The ability to understand financial processes applicable to one's job or command level is considered a fundamental TAR officer competency. This competency includes both a macro-level and a micro-level understanding of these processes. Interviewees indicate that TAR officers, in general, lack sufficient knowledge in both micro- and macro-level financial processes. Officer H describes this competency gap.

I think there are big [knowledge] gaps in the finance world. Most Naval Officers don't come in [the Navy] to be budget guys; they come in to be warfare officers. So they don't like to deal with the money. The Suppo [Supply Officer] does the money stuff.

Officers start their naval careers not being involved with or responsible for financial affairs, as in mid- or large sized activities, the command's supply officer handles these responsibilities. However, TAR officers assigned to relatively small Reserve field activities must manage their command's finances, hence need strong expertise in micro-level Reserve finances. In addition, senior TAR officers or those assigned to major staffs must possess a macro-level understanding of Naval Reserve-related financial processes.

8. Expertise to be a Staff Officer

TAR officers, particularly those in senior grades, are often assigned to billets on major staff commands. Commands to which TAR officers are typically assigned include COMNAVRESFOR, COMNAVAIRESFOR, COMNAVSURFRESFOR, OPNAV, and

BUPERS. Reserve Liaison Officers (RLOs) may be assigned to the staff of a commander-in-chief, or other major Navy or joint commands. Many surface TAR officers, both junior and senior officers, are assigned to the staff of the geographically dispersed Regional Reserve Readiness Commands. In addition, TAR officers may be assigned to staffs of civilian appointees in the DoD.

In general, staffs are high echelon, non-operational commands that develop policy and oversee the administration of their subordinate activities. Senior, rather than junior officers, as well as civilians, typically comprise a staff. Staff work may involve working on large, long-term and often on-going projects, such as budget planning. Staff work can involve coordination of issues, long-range planning, resource allocation, and, particularly in tours in the Pentagon arena, can require political skills.

Several of the interviewees feel that the ability to serve effectively as a staff officer should be considered a TAR officer competency. It is expressed that TAR officers need to recognize and nurture this important competency. These interviewees also sense that expertise to be an effective staff officer may be overlooked or devalued in comparison to the expertise required for operational tours, such as those on ships or with squadrons, or in comparison to the expertise required for field-level Reserve management tours. The Naval Reserve has many programs, issues, rules and organizational characteristics quite distinct from the regular Navy. The TAR officers on major staffs often must explain, promote, and defend the Naval Reserve to the regular Navy, to members of other military services, and to civilians. Hence, TAR officers in staff billets should be fluent in Reserve matters. Officer A feels that, in many ways, the TAR officer community is a staff corps and thus, staff expertise should be valued as strongly as operational expertise.

We have to see ourselves as the Navy's consultants on Reserve issues. One of those little skill sets they teach you in the [regular Navy] action officer course, we don't teach people here [in the Naval Reserve]. Within our own major staffs, people have not been taught basic action officer issues. Well, the fact that you're out at a REDCOM doesn't mean you're not on a major staff; you're on a geographically dispersed major staff. We've got this Echelon IV that's out there in pieces, but they still need to know the basic coordination of staff issues.

...We all want to be operators, but we're staff officers. You want to get into a War College thing, Clausewitz tells of the vital importance of your staff officer cadre. So we have to reculturalize ourselves to see that this is important professional skill set. If we're very good at coordinating, at finding information, at staffing things, if we present this tremendously capable professional image to active Navy, then we don't have to feel like we're second string. We [TAR officers] should become this wonderful, professional corps.

Officer F expresses particular concern that a perceived bias towards operational expertise in the TAR community diminishes the attention to Reserve management – the fundamental charter of the TAR community. He feels that the battle being fought by staffers in the halls and offices of the Pentagon are perhaps just as important as those being fought in the fleet – and, accordingly, that staff work should be recognized as critical to the Naval Reserve.

[When I was at the Pentagon, there were] very few [TAR officers] that knew how to do the proper staff work to work law into policy into directives...we need to keep track of who those good people that we have that aren't going back to sea, that aren't going back to be CO of that squadron and develop staffers who can fight the battles in the Pentagon with the Army and the Air Force staffers who do tour [after] tour [after] tour [in the Pentagon]. ...[Often] the response was, 'Well, you know, we need to take care of our operators. We need to keep grooming for flag'.... But you know, there's only one [TAR] flag. I don't disagree that we need some operators. But at the cost we're ignoring [non-operators]...when you look at the promotion stats of the IT [information technology] specialists—that's been bad--the FM'ers [financial management] to captain—that's been bad. And the manpower people--they're losing out. Who's taking care of my Reserves?

Staff work expertise includes knowledge of the procedures and processes of workflow within the organizational structure and culture of a major staff. It also includes recognizing the relationships of players on a major staff and developing working relationships with those players pertinent to your tasks – in essence, developing political skills. Interviewee F stresses the importance of staff officers understanding the “unwritten system” of an environment, such as that at the Pentagon, and of learning how to effectively accomplish one's objectives while working within this unique, at times political, system.

[This competency involves] how you can leverage different people and bring them in... how you work issues in the Pentagon ... and [learning] some of the guidelines that we [TAR officers at the Pentagon] worked with there that made things work better... You either can be idealistic and ineffective or you can understand how the game is played and beat the people at their own game. And until you accept the fact that you have to work within the system, you will not be as effective as you could be [working at the Pentagon]. ... [The book called] Assignment Pentagon...has some real nuggets in there that were really good. It talked about being an effective staffer there.... I have seen good operational people go into that organization [Pentagon], go into D.C. and not adapt.

A large part of this competency is the skill of doing research and of pursuing the proper source of information for an issue in order to be confident of its accuracy, rather than making assumptions or asking someone for an answer without verifying it. Staff work demands the ability to search for and understand pertinent directives, instructions, and other source documents. It can also include the ability to summarize effectively and present information and issues to others, in such vehicles as point papers, reports, and presentations. However, the ability to serve as a staff officer also includes communication, political, and other skills needed to build credibility and gain leverage in political-type organizations, such as those of many major staff commands. Officer F emphasizes the importance of knowing of key personnel as a staff officer.

I was very lucky to go to the Naval War College before I went to D.C., because the War College helped—there's the one section that talked about bureaucracy and compromise and how you work together in large organizations like that, and gave me many tools for going in and working in that area. If a person is going to do staff work in D.C., I think that what they need is an education of ‘who’s who in the zoo’ there. Because, even as time goes on here [current command], because of the time that I spent there [Pentagon] that I’m able to tell the captains and commanders here, “Okay, you’re dealing with this person and here’s, “Okay the level,” and sometimes I’ll pull out the DoD phone book and say, now let’s find this person. Here’s SECDEF, here’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.” Even within the SECDEF organization... [We should] try and bring in the OPNAV organization, so they understand whose working with whom and how the organizations interact and how they need to be communicated with.

The understanding of both policy development and policy implementation is also critical for TAR staff officers at the policy-making level. Almost all TAR officers at the

policy-making echelon II or III level have previously served at the field or lower-echelon levels. Several interviewees suggest that it appears that TAR officers at the higher, policy-making levels seem to forget the difficulties faced by lower levels in implementing the policy. An understanding of the implications of policy is an important part of this competency, as described by Officer D, who at the time of the interview was working in a high echelon command.

A lot of my answers are coming from a perspective of having been out at the Reserve Center. A lot of what we do here in this building [COMNAVRESFOR] is more or less a reflection of what we want the Reserve centers to do. I think everyone in this building needs to have an Echelon V perspective in the back of his or her head every single day. We can't do our jobs effectively unless we know the impact of what we put out in e-mails to the field, to that center CO in Wichita, Kansas.

It is felt that there is a competency gap among some TAR officers in staff officer expertise – both in terms of researching for information and in the context of understanding how to work within the organizational culture of major staffs. Interviewees indicate that there is a learning curve TAR officers must go through to develop these skills, and that there is currently no formal training and development program to foster this competency. As most TAR officers assigned to major staff commands are senior-level officers, it is assumed that they have informally been exposed, or at least somewhat prepared, for the challenges that await them in a staff officer tour.

Interviewees, in general, feel that the ability to perform as a staff officer should be included as a TAR officer competency – particularly for senior TAR officers. This competency includes understanding both the official and the unofficial work procedures and policies of major staffs, and requires skills for researching an issue, planning and coordinating resources, and building professional, working relationships in a complex, often political, organizational environment.

9. Skills in Project Management

Several interviewees specifically mentioned expertise in project management as a TAR officer competency. Project management is a formally taught discipline offered by numerous certified learning organizations. Coursework completion can lead to a certification as a professional project manager. The course curriculum is geared towards

developing skills and knowledge to help people manage projects of various sizes and degrees of complexity. In general, project management encompasses such areas as: developing strategic objectives, planning, scheduling, budgeting, prioritizing, allocating scarce resources, risk analysis, and working on cross-functional projects. The discipline is intended to help people who work in a complex, cross-functional environment and who face time and budget constraints achieve their objectives regarding a project or program.

In one interview, Officer B explains that project management differs from conducting the normal, on-going, day-to-day business processes; rather, it concerns an effort to improve a process or function, or is a special project that exists beyond the normal work processes.

Project management [is] an organizational capability to take limited resources and apply them to specific spots, in order to ensure that we continue to move down [our] strategic path...A project essentially is anything that you do above and beyond the normal everyday business. There are things we do on a day-to-day basis on a staff or things we do at a Reserve center that are just the functions of what you do... the business you're in. There are things that you do that are outside of your business that you have to make decisions [about] if you want to apply resources to do those things. ...It's not so far from doing management by objectives and has some commonality with Deming's theories.... Project management is a management of projects. We do projects all the time in the Navy. But... certified project managers have a specific skill of managing projects... that's to bring all the resources together and manage who does what portion of the project, and to get the project from the beginning to its end.... This (covers) money resources, doing risk analysis, doing project planning.

One provider of Project Management learning resources, ESI International, Inc., currently provides training to TAR officers at COMNAVSURFRESFOR. Core courses offered by this provider include: Managing Projects in Organizations, Project Leadership, Management and Communications, Quality for Project Managers, Scheduling and Cost Control, Risk Management, and Contracting for Project Managers. The goal of offering this educational opportunity is to help TAR officers better manage their projects while in their current major staff tour, and to help them take skills with them in future TAR tours. Officer S further explains the objective of fostering project management skills in TAR officers.

Another [TAR officer] competency would be project management. As a RESCEN CO, you need to understand business processes, how to manage projects. To try to better something at a RESCEN, you need to understand a process of how to get from point A to point B.... you need to have an understanding of managing different projects and then trying to get the right people assigned to different jobs and get the right things accomplished...to implement programs. I think it [project management] is implementing things and using a logical sequence...we need to understand that process and you shouldn't wait until you get to the echelon II or III level to get it. The earlier you get that training in your career, the better off you'll be. I'm not sure if that means the RECOM or RESCEN CO level. If they have to take a course in project management, it's going to make it a lot better...If [policy is made] from the echelon II level, it's going to filter down to somebody. So if they [lower levels] had a better idea of how to manage stuff, they'd be better off. Because, out there [in the field] you're going to be all by yourself. These guys [higher echelons] are very good at sending down direction, but all they'll tell you is "make this happen." They're not going to give you [at lower levels] a lot of detail of how to make it happen.

The level of detailed expertise in project management that TAR officers should have was not clearly specified in the interviews, however one interviewee stated that course providers currently offer project management courses for executive level, as well as middle management level officers. Interviewees indicated that the more complex a project is, the greater the need for project management skills. There is a perceived gap in TAR officers' current level of expertise in project management and the desired level.

C. PRIORITIZATION OF COMPETENCIES

An electronic survey was sent to each of the interview participants to determine how the interviewees would prioritize the competencies. The survey, shown in Appendix C, lists each of the nine competencies and provides a brief description of each. The interviewees were asked to put a number next to each competency to indicate how essential each is using 1=most essential and 9=least essential.

A total of 18 completed surveys were returned, resulting in an 86 percent response rate. The responses of each survey participant are provided in Appendix D. The rankings for each competency were averaged, resulting in the following ranking of competencies, listed in order of most to least essential:

<u>Competency</u>	<u>Average Score</u> (1=most essential)
1. Understanding of RESCEN/NAR operations	2.4
2. Understanding of Naval Reserve Force organization	2.7
3. Understanding of manpower processes	3.7
4. Expertise to be a commanding officer	4.2
5. Understanding of mobilization processes	4.7
6. Ability to use/manipulate information systems	5.5
7. Understanding of financial processes	5.6
8. Expertise to be a staff officer	7.2
9. Skills in project management	8.3

The majority of respondents reported no difficulty in prioritizing the competencies. Two interviewees commented that they consider all nine competencies to be essential, and that, while they did rank the competencies, they see no large differences among the priorities of the competencies. In a written comment to one survey, Officer S offered this opinion:

These are all very important skill sets for a successful TAR officer, and I would rank all of them as #1 if I could. In actuality, I would measure the difference between each of them in millimeters, vice inches. The ranking is just that close.

Two other respondents indicate that they perceive a grouping of highly essential competencies that are closely ranked, and another grouping of closely ranked competencies that are less essential. Two other interviewees indicate that it is difficult to evaluate the level of effectiveness of each competency, as considered over the entire career span of a TAR officer, rather than for a specific billet or career phase. One of these officers further elaborated that within competencies there are dimensions that are more critical at a junior officer level and other dimensions that are more critical for senior officers.

Overall, the prioritization of competencies, as obtained from the survey, offers a general perception of how essential the competencies are for TAR officers, in the context of an entire career span as opposed to one specific officer level or billet. As will be discussed in Chapter VI, further research should be conducted to differentiate which competencies, or dimensions of competencies, are most essential for specific phases in a TAR officer's career.

In general, the survey respondents do not widely differ in how they rank the competencies. The survey responses fairly consistently indicate the competencies pertaining to the operations of field-level Reserve activities, the organization of the Naval Reserve, and manpower processes are most essential. Similarly, the responses fairly consistently indicate that the competencies pertaining to project management and staff officer skills are, while still essential, least essential, relative to the others.

D. COMPETENCY GAPS

1. Career Development Phases

All of the senior officers interviewed perceive gaps in the nine competencies; that is, the interviewees feel that the level of proficiency that TAR officers possess in each of the competencies, in general, is below the required baseline level of proficiency. Beyond the baseline level, it is entirely expected that, based on their individual tour experiences and areas of expertise, some TAR officers will have a greater degree of specialized knowledge in certain areas than will others. It is the inconsistent level of baseline, rather than advanced, knowledge that concerns the interviewees.

Several points should be made regarding the perceived baseline competency gaps among TAR officers:

- Time and experience are required to acquire the specialized knowledge represented in each of the nine competencies
- Different levels of competency proficiency are required at different phases of a TAR officer's career

It is recognized that TAR officers cannot acquire all of the required baseline level of competencies in a short period of time, or entirely during the early phases of their TAR career. As was discussed in Chapter II, TAR officers experience a learning curve in acquiring Naval Reserve management-related knowledge and abilities. During a TAR

officer's early career phase, as a lieutenant or lieutenant commander, he or she will likely have Reserve management tours that offer exposure to the micro-levels of the competencies, such as: management of Reserve personnel assignment (manpower competency); management of a command operating budget (finance competency); familiarity with immediate supervisory levels within the Naval Reserve organization (Naval Reserve organization competency); and knowledge of activity-specific mobilization processes (mobilization competency). Analysis of the interviews indicates that the macro-level aspect of the competencies is more likely to be acquired during the later phases of one's TAR career, as a commander or captain. During the senior rank tours, TAR officers are likely to be exposed to the macro-level dimensions of competencies, such as: knowledge of billet creation and structuring processes (manpower competency); funding and the budget processes (finance competency); awareness of the broad interactions between the Navy Reserve and the active Navy (Navy Reserve organization competency); and familiarity with the entire mobilization process (mobilization competency). It should be noted that, at least on the surface side, since both junior and senior TAR officers are assigned to be commanding officers, the requirement for the commanding officer-related competency, unlike that of most of the competencies, crosses the junior and senior career phases.

The points made in the previous paragraph are not inconsistent with the need to establish generic, baseline competency requirements for TAR officers. The competencies could be considered as professional standards that TAR officers should develop during appropriate phases of their careers; baseline level in some competencies will be achieved earlier than in other competencies, depending of the Reserve management experience of each TAR officer. However, as discussed earlier, the interviewees perceive that the current level of competencies possessed by TAR officers, in general, falls below that of the essential baseline. As gleaned from the interviews, the following discussion in parts 2 through 4 explores three general causes for these competency gaps.

2. Inconsistent and Insufficient Formal Training

As is discussed in Chapter II, the NAVRESPROFDEVVCEN is considered to be a very valuable resource for orientating and exposing TAR officers to the Naval Reserve,

as well as to specific jobs, such as RESCEN CO and RLO. However, interviewees feel that the training offered to TAR officers is insufficient, in terms of

- Consistency of training of fundamental material to all TAR officers
- Scope and breadth of material
- Depth and detail of material
- Matching training to the learning needs TAR officers have at different career phases

The training pipeline for new TAR officers is not consistent. Officer S explains that participants in the TAR Officer Accession (TOA) course are generally from the Surface Reserve, rather from than Air Reserve community, and that course participation is not mandatory for all new TAR officers.

There is no standard policy that says an individual has to go to the TAR Officer Accession Course. There are individuals redesignated as a TAR, air or surface, and the detailer will put in their orders to attend the TOA course. It happens in some cases, in some cases it doesn't. ...Most of the guys that come through [the TOA] now are surface types that are going to either REDCOMS as Training Officers or individuals who are going to a large Reserve center either as XO or CO.

A typical first TAR assignment for many newly assessed surface Reserve officers is to be CO of a Naval Reserve Center. These officers are sent to the Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO) course, as explained in Chapter II. Interviewees indicate that this two-week course alone does not adequately prepare officers for the responsibilities of a CO position, nor for the transition into an organization that is quite different from the one they just left. Officer N describes an opinion shared by many officers interviewed.

We take a [newly assessed] senior lieutenant or junior lieutenant commander, take them out of seven, eight, nine, ten years of experience, and put them into a new program [TAR]. People who are relatively senior, at least mid-grade, all of a sudden starting a new program, and for training they go to New Orleans for two weeks and get the fire-hose treatment. Then they're basically taken out of the fire and put into the frying pan.

The PCO course itself is viewed as valuable, but, as is further explained below by Officer G, this course lacks sufficient scope and depth to sufficiently equip prospective COs.

For officers that we assess into the TAR program and send straight to a Reserve Center, we probably don't do a very good job of preparing those individuals. We send them to a PCO course. We send them for a week or two or whatever and give them some kind of broad, fresh exposure to all the things which includes, environmental, and IG and all the other things, so they get the shotgun blast at all the topics and exposure to it. Then we send them back out to Reserve Center and tell them to go forth and produce. I'm not sure that's preparing them adequately to do a good job.

Hence, one contributing factor to the competency gaps among TAR officers is the inconsistent and insufficient training regarding Naval Reserve management.

3. Inconsistent OTJ Learning (Reserve Management Tours Versus Operational Tours)

As stated by Officer N, "Most reserve training happens on the job." Yet, both across and within the various designator communities, TAR officers, in general, have different career paths and tour experiences. There are at least four types of career paths among TAR line officers. The TAR career path among most aviation TAR officers is predominately operational, with relatively little direct Reserve management exposure; in contrast, the career track for a minority of aviation TAR officers is heavy in Reserve management tours. Surface warfare qualified TAR officers typically rotate operational tours with Reserve management tours, and the TAR tours of Fleet Support officers are predominately in Reserve management.

In general, interviewees indicate that, while operational experience is essential for career development within one's warfare designator, operational experience is gained at the expense of Reserve management experience. The alternating sea and Reserve management tours for surface warfare officers generally impedes consistent, on-going development of Reserve management-related competencies among these officers; such competency development occurs generally only during the shore-based Reserve management tours, as is discussed by Officer S.

A surface guy's career path puts him at a Reserve center, at a REDCOM, on a ship... They've got different experience levels... they typically get

assessed [as a TAR] as a Division officer on a ship. They're going to go from that ship to a Reserve activity. Then back to Department Head School. Then back to the fleet for two to three years. Then they're going to be drawn back to the Reserve side of the house, typically as a senior LT or as a junior LCDR, with a four to five year gap when they've had nothing to do with the Reserve side of the house...

Yet, overall, interviewees still consider surface TAR officers, in general, to be more proficient in Reserve management than their aviation counterparts, as is expressed by Officer Q.

There's a different career path altogether for the Surface TAR officers and the Aviator TARs. I think the Surface side has a lot more exposure to the actual management of Reservists whereas aviators are more concerned with flying, hardware issues...interacting with the SELRES that [operational] way, rather than actual management...

The dichotomy between an operations-focused career and a Reserve management-focused career is even more extreme within the aviation TAR community. The operational RESFORON career path is unofficially referred to as the "A-track," while the aviation Reserve management career path, including assignments at NARs, is unofficially called the "B-track." While many drilling Reservists are assigned to units at RESFORONS, the staff at the supporting NAR performs much of the Reservists' administration. Officer M describes that Reserve management expertise differs markedly between the two tracks.

An A-Track player comes in as a TAR and does a RESFORON tour, then either stays in that RESFORON, goes to another RESFORON, or goes to CAG [Carrier Air Group] staff. So it's all operational...unless you do something extremely bad on the Air side, RESFORON COs will become captains.... The B-Track [player] has to have to find an alternate way to get to captain... maybe be the RPD [Reserve Program Director] of a NAR, and then look for a major staff tour or some kind of visibility tour where you can break out from the crowd...so that you can be XO of an Air Station, or CO of an NARCEN so that you can make captain.... If you ever want to know anything about Reserve Management, go to a B-Track [person]... There's a need [for A-track TARs to know more about Reserve management], but is it a pressing need? No, because the B-Track guys will do it for them.

Aviation interviewees describe that, ideally, all newly assessed aviation TAR officers would have at least an initial tour at a NAR, to gain Reserve management

exposure. However, the critical manpower shortage in the squadrons often precludes this type of orientation tour, as aviators are needed to fill high-priority billets in RESFORONs.

4. Inconsistent Motivation (to Acquire Reserve Management Expertise)

It is recognized among the interviewees that those TAR officers on an operational career track need to retain an operational focus in order to get promoted within their warfare community. This fact creates what several interviewees consider to be an inconsistent reward system for developing Reserve Management expertise among TAR officers. In the Navy, promotion boards represent the fundamental reward system for professional achievement. The criteria used by promotion boards to select officers for promotion is typically well known by officers; the motivation to get promoted creates incentive to demonstrate proficiency in the criteria used by the selection board. Interviewees indicate that, among warfare specialty communities, a significant amount of the promotion criteria are operational-based. Operational criteria includes receiving strong fitness reports from operational tours and ultimately, to be selected to serve as XO, then as CO, of a ship or squadron. Officer F indicates that the promotion system for TAR officers rewards operational expertise, to the perceived detriment of Reserve management expertise.

For whatever the operators want to say, and I'll go against what some of the leadership says about having to be operational, operational, operational. There were TARs that helped develop the Naval Reserve as it was in the late '80s. They knew how to work the policy; they knew the instructions. They may not have been to sea for about 18 years but they knew Reserve administration and management. I think, too many times today, the SWO side and the Aviation side keep pounding in that the only way you can be a successful TAR, the only way you can make it to captain, is you have to be an operator...and oh yeah, every once in awhile we'll put you in a Reserve Management position so that you're still a TAR. I think that has hurt the TAR community.... there is no one that's looking at writing the policy—that there are too many operators off wanting to have command of the ships or to have command of the squadrons, and we've forgotten that TAR stands for Training and Administration of the Reserve.

Most interviewees did not advocate a change in the current promotion system; however they did recognize the inherent dichotomy between the motivation to progress

through the operational “wickets” that are essential for promotion within a warfare community and the motivation to develop expertise in Reserve management.

E. INTERVIEWEE SUGGESTIONS REGARDING TAR OFFICER COMPETENCY DEVELOPMENT

Many of the officers interviewed offered suggestions regarding how to align current competency levels among TAR officers with, at a minimum, the baseline required competency levels. A fairly common suggestion was to expand the current TAR officer curricula offered by the NAVRESPROFDEVVCEN. As expressed by Officer N, the Reserve school is a valuable, but underutilized, resource for training TAR officers.

I've been through a lot of Navy schools and most of the schools [where] I've been [are] in the USN operational side. And to be totally honest, that [PCO] course actually was as good as or better than just about any course I've ever been to in the Navy... So when the Reserve program puts their mind to putting on a course, it's as good as or better than the USN side. The problem is that we really expect [TAR] officers to train themselves in just about every aspect that we [Reserves] do. And some are better at that than others.

Overall, the interviewees indicate that the TOA and PCO courses are useful, but, as they are fairly short in duration, they lack sufficient coverage of course material. The recommendations from interviewees discuss types of training vehicles, as well as training content and periodicity. Several interviewees consider electronic learning (“e-learning”) resources to be a potential avenue for expanded instruction, particularly since the flexibility of this vehicle could increase training opportunities for TAR officers. At the same time, in-person classroom training is also considered valuable. Officer K indicates that a combination of training vehicles can be appropriate.

I think you should consider delivering [training] for many of the [competencies]. Some of this is dialog. Where you actually need a formal course, maybe half, maybe a third [of the material]... You need to consider leveraging technology and [using] the Navy e-learning system to make this stuff available...where they can actually do it online, get credit online, much like you used to do with correspondence courses. You may make it so [there are] prerequisites before they even come to the course, and make them validate that by this electronically generated thing. So you don't want to spend four hours in a symposium talking about sexual harassment. Maybe you want to spend a half hour talking about it; maybe you want to do a four-hour computer based training thing. If we don't leverage that technology we will always be tied to the brick and mortar

and always be stuck with the whims of the schedulers as to when we can develop skills that we should have.

Suggestions for alternatives to classroom training include web-based modules – vehicles that NAVRESPROFDEVVCEN is already actively pursuing in several of its courses. Officer N suggests that such officer-level modules could correspond to the fundamental competencies discussed in the interview.

I like the idea of a web-based college-level correspondence course. I mean, we do that for the Naval War College extension. Why can't we do that for TAR [officer] administration? Have a Manpower module. Have a training module. Have a medical module. Have a supply module. Obviously different modules are going to be more complex than others...

Several interviewees referred to a course called Naval Reserve Advanced Management Seminars (NRAMS), which historically has been offered to senior- level drilling Reservists. It is considered that the content of this course could be appropriate for TAR officers, as it offers exposure to some macro-level competencies, including the budget and billet creation processes. Officer G suggests that an electronic version of the NRAMS course could be valuable training for mid-grade TAR officers. Other interviewees also indicate that mid-grade officers need additional exposure to senior-officer level dimensions of Reserve management. Below, Officer H discusses the concept of offering training to TAR officers at the mid-grade level.

I think for a mid-grade officer, 0-4 or junior 0-5, some mid-grade management course would be good...You've been a TAR now seven or eight years, let's review some of these things that are going on, and let's add to some of them things that maybe you don't know about. [like] national military strategy. Not quite a War College course... but at some point you've got to start thinking about big items and how it flows down. ...You start at the JCS [Joint Chief of Staff] and the ROC and POE...and all that stuff on the mission side. Or you start at Congress and requirements and funding and how you finally are able to spend on your charge card down on the other side. I mean you've been out there and you've been getting snippets and you've put out some fires and you've figured out how to do a few things and then it's probably good to sit back for five weeks or six weeks and say, you know here's how all those things might fit together.

The concept of some kind of periodic refresher training for TAR officers was also mentioned in other interviews. Several officers cited the Navy's leadership continuum

training as an example of periodic training appropriate at distinct flow points in an officer's career. As explained by Officer I, such periodic training could also be a useful way to update officers on current naval policies.

The CNO requires us to teach people [about] fraternization, harassment, drug and alcohol abuse policy every two years. Look at the leadership training continuum. You have to go through that two-week course about every four years on average.... As [a TAR's] career progresses, we could very easily refresh people in all of the things we just talked about with a two- or three- week course that all TAR Officers get en-route to every TAR billet [or] every three or four years. Because the truth changes every three or four years and folks just don't get it [current information].

Several of the interviewees consider the value of establishing some sort of TAR officer qualification program, as a means of developing fundamental competencies in the TAR officer community. Officer N discusses how a TAR qualification program could borrow some concepts from the U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer qualification program.

The way the Navy promotion system is set up is based on performance... there are certain hoops that you have to go through, like on the Surface Side, which I'm familiar with. You basically have to be a successful Division Officer, Department Head, XO, CO. You have got to get your warfare qualification. I don't know why you can't have something [for TARs]. You don't need an insignia for it because I don't think it would be appropriate, but why don't you have a training administration qualification that you get maybe as a late lieutenant or mid-grade lieutenant commander. And then, of course, for these guys and gals that are transferring over late in their careers, you'd have to give them a little more time to get the thing. A destroyer squadron has qual boards, where two ship COs sit down and qualify an XO for command, and that's an oral board. He's got to go through the PXO Course and he's got to satisfy certain requirements and then he has the oral boards. Why can't we do that for the TAR Programs? And again, by the time a person gets through the oral board you're really looking for the person's ability to articulate verbally, their thought process, their demeanor, and their leadership quals, that type of thing.

Officer S also expresses the idea that TAR officers could benefit from a standard professional development program.

First, you need a formal school. Everybody who's a brand new TAR, I don't care if you're a LT or a CDR, should be required to go to the TOA

course. Once you finish the TOA course, there should be something that comes out of that course, whether it's a PQS book or whatever, that's going to take you up to the next level of knowledge. And then, from there, once we get a clearly defined career path, for your next step in the career path, there should be something that takes you from point A to point B.

If it's a web-based PQS...Then we're going to have to have some kind of tracking matrix, when the detailer goes to that guy's record, he can say, this guy's punched this ticket, this ticket, etc. We don't have a clearly defined career path, outside of the general 1117 path. There is nothing that says: "This is what you need to know as a TAR."... You've got specialized tracks [in the regular Navy]. You're going to be a division officer, but are you going to be weapons or engineering...how to round that thing out. That's what we need to do. We need to further define that.

Not all officers interviewed mentioned that completion of qualifications should be required and monitored by the TAR detailing community; however, nearly all interviewees feel that additional resources for training and development of TAR officers are needed.

The interviews also reveal that any significant effort to establish greater emphasis on Naval Reserve management-related competencies must be strongly supported by top leadership in the Naval Reserve. Officer A feels that for any sort of program designed to nurture TAR officer competencies to grow, Naval Reserve leadership must show clear support for the concept.

I think that the first issue is that everybody has to believe that this [Reserve management] is important information to know...you need the top leadership to be saying 'This is important. Here is the vision. Here's why you need to know this. I am charging all of you to be conversant at least in these issues, because you are my representatives to the fleet, to the senior SELRES, to anybody you talk to.' ...That signal from the top is vital...

Overall, interviewees suggest that efforts to bring the TAR officer community to a minimum level of expertise in Naval Reserve management could include expanded course offerings through e-learning, as well as through traditional classroom instruction. Periodic training beyond the initial TOA course could offer mid-management level exposure to Naval Reserve management competencies. The possibility of a formal TAR officer professional qualification program was also raised. In addition, the support from

top Naval Reserve leadership for any significant TAR officer development effort is considered critical.

F. IMPLICATIONS OF ESTABLISHING REQUIRED BASELINE RESERVE MANAGEMENT-RELATED COMPETENCIES FOR TAR OFFICERS

The determination of essential baseline Reserve management-related competencies for TAR officers could serve as the foundation for development of a training and career development program for TAR officers. Such a program could branch out from the courses currently offered by the NAVRESPROFDEVVCEN and offer other resources – perhaps not all structured as formal courses – for on-going development of Reserve management expertise during a TAR officer’s career. If the ultimate goal is for each TAR officer community to possess at least a baseline level of competency in Reserve management, as applicable to his or her billet and career phase, then a comprehensive training and development pipeline should, it seems, be built into the career paths of TAR officers.

During the interviews, several officers raised both interest and concern regarding the consideration of establishing some sort of TAR officer version of a professional qualification standard (PQS) or additional qualification designator (AQD) type program. It appears that formal establishment and sanctioning of TAR officer core competencies might offer both benefits and challenges. A clear definition of essential Reserve management-related competencies – specifically defined at critical flow points within a TAR officer’s career – in conjunction with some sort of training continuum to foster proficiency in the competency areas, could result in a more consistent level of baseline Reserve management knowledge among TAR officers. The ultimate benefit of this would be a consistently strong level of support to, and management of, Reservists, as well as a consistently strong and positive support to and the relationship with the active Navy.

Implications of establishing “official” TAR officer competency levels could also present areas of consideration, such as those listed below:

- Establishment of a training and development program through which TAR officers could seek to attain the competencies should precede establishment of any sort of formally sanctioned TAR officer competencies. That is, TAR officers should not be made to feel

accountable for developing competencies without first having resources made available to them with which to help develop the competencies.

- If TAR officer professional standards are established, consideration should be given to whether the standards can realistically be applied to TAR officers in all designator communities. That is, the expectation of achieving minimum abilities in Reserve-management should be realistic, given the current diverse career paths for TAR officers.
- Consideration should be given as to whether formally established competency standards are to be used as recommended development guidelines or, ultimately, as promotion criteria. If only used as guidelines, there might be a lack of motivation among officers to develop the competencies, particularly if time and effort in developing them might be at the expense of developing operational competencies required for promotion. However, if the competency standards are ultimately to be used as promotion criteria, a dramatic organizational cultural change may be required; the reward system would require fundamental changes, to alter the different levels of emphasis given to operational versus Reserve management achievements. A lessened emphasis on operational expertise as promotion criteria could be detrimental to the professional development of warfare qualified TAR officers. In either case, the issue raised by several interviewees regarding the reward system deserves to be approached with care.

This author does not offer the opinion that the current reward system should or should not be changed – only that serious consideration must be given to the long-term implications of sanctioned competency standards, before such standards might be established. At the same time, it is the opinion of the author that use of competency standards to drive development of expanded training and development continuum for TAR officers could be extremely valuable; in fact, given the natural variation in TAR officer career paths and the resulting inconsistent OJT experiences, a consistent training pipeline, to expose all TAR officers to similar Reserve management competencies, could be of long-term benefit to individual TAR officers and to the entire Naval Reserve community.

G. CHAPTER SUMMARY

As gleaned from interviews with experienced, senior TAR officers, there are nine fundamental Naval Reserve management-related core competencies for TAR officers. The competencies are prioritized in terms of how essential the interviewees consider them, in the context of an entire TAR officer career span, given that the actual required proficiency level of each competency depends on the specific billet and career phase of

each individual officer. The officers interviewed feel that there are gaps between the overall level of proficiency required in each competency and the overall proficiency level of the TAR officer community. There are several possible reasons for these competency gaps, as well as various potential methods for “closing” the competency gaps. A potential program in which TAR officers would be required to develop specific baseline competencies appears attractive in several ways, but also would present implementation challenges.

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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY

1. The Nine Fundamental Competencies for TAR Officers

Research and analysis of knowledge, skills and abilities required for TAR officers has identified nine Reserve management-related TAR officer competencies. These competencies are listed below, in descending order of how essential each competency is throughout an entire TAR career span.

a. Understanding of RESCEN/NAR/NARCEN Operations

It is essential that TAR officers possess knowledge of the key processes at field-level Reserve activities, including administration, drill pay, orders/travel, and training. This competency requires knowledge of pertinent Navy instructions and policies.

b. Understanding of the Naval Reserve Organization

Officers are expected to know the mission, administrative organization and operational assets of the Naval Reserve. They also must understand the Naval Reserve's relationship with gaining commands and CINCs, and how the Reserve "fits" with, and differs from, the regular Navy.

c. Understanding of Manpower Processes

Macro-level dimensions of this competency include knowledge of the billet creation and structuring processes, the roles of claimants, resource sponsors and of the TFMMS system, as well as of current manpower policies. Micro-level dimensions include the ability to manage unit assignment of Reserve personnel.

d. Expertise to be a Commanding Officer

Officers should have command leadership skills, including familiarity with the Navy's "people" policies, legal resources, facilities management, and public relations skills. The ability to perform independent duty as a CO is also important.

e. Understanding of Mobilization Processes

Macro-level dimensions of this competency include knowledge of the overall mobilization process, from start to finish; micro-level dimensions include in-depth knowledge of the specific mobilization processes at one's own activity.

f. Ability to Use/Manipulate Information Systems

Officers are expected to have a detailed understanding of corporate systems that may be operated at their activity, such as NSIPS, RSTARS, and NOW. They also should have an understanding of the role of and data contained in systems operated at a remote command, such as TFMMS, IMAPMIS, and RHS. General manager-level computer skills are also required.

g. Understanding of Financial Processes

Macro-level dimensions of this competency include knowledge of how the Naval Reserve obtains its funding, including familiarity with appropriations and budget processes, and of different types of funds, such as OM&NR and RPN. Micro-level dimensions include the ability to manage the operating budget maintained by one's own command.

h. Expertise to be a Staff Officer

The competency requires knowledge of work processes at a major staff, ability to research and present information pertaining to an issue, and people-related, political skills to "work within the system."

i. Skills in Project Management

Officers should have knowledge of the key dimensions of this discipline, including risk management, quality, contracting, and resource allocation.

2. Competency Gaps

The level of proficiency required in the dimensions of each competency depends on specific billet and career phase of each individual officer. However, the officers interviewed indicate that, overall, there are gaps between the level of proficiency TAR officers should have in each competency and the level of proficiency currently possessed by the officer community. In particular, the gaps appear largest in the macro-level dimensions of competencies, such as understanding of the billet creation and structuring processes, the budget and funding processes, and the "fit" between the Naval Reserve and the regular Navy. In addition, since TAR officers frequently assume command at a much more junior level than do their regular Navy counterparts, there is a perceived deficiency in the skills required to be a commanding officer among many, particularly junior, TAR officers.

As stated in Chapter II, the two primary methods by which TAR officers acquire proficiency in Naval Reserve management-related competencies are formal training and on-the-job training. One reason for the perceived competency gaps is insufficient formal Reserve management-related training for TAR officers. While current TAR officer courses offered by NAVRESPROFDEVVCEN -- TOA, PCO, and RLO -- provide valuable exposure to aspects of Naval Reserve management, not all TAR officers take these courses. There also is no advanced-level training in Naval Reserve management offered to all mid- or senior-grade officers. In addition, since the Navy-wide officer leadership training continuum is designed to meet leadership needs of regular Navy officer career phases, many TAR officers do not receive the leadership training appropriate for TAR career responsibilities.

A second key reason for the competency gaps is inconsistent on-the-job exposure to Reserve management during TAR officers' careers. Exposure to Naval Reserve management differs significantly across TAR officers, based on the different career paths among officers within the surface and aviation communities. Surface warfare TAR officers often rotate between operational and Reserve administration tours, creating gaps in development of Reserve management expertise. There is also significant variation of Reserve management exposure within the aviation community, based on whether the TAR officers are on an operational or Naval Reserve administration career track.

Training and Administration of Reserve officers have a dual-hatted professional focus; they must gain expertise and pass professional milestones within their specific officer designator, such as the surface or aviation warfare communities. In addition, they are expected to gain expertise and pass professional milestones within the TAR community, with respect to Naval Reserve management.

Suggestions for ways to further develop Reserve management-related competencies in TAR officers include expansion of current TAR officer course curricula, including a potential training continuum to offer training appropriate at key TAR officer career flow points. There currently is no force-wide program for developing Naval Reserve management expertise among TAR officers. The concept of potentially establishing some form of TAR officer professional standards is considered beneficial, as

it could provide clear definition of baseline required professional competencies. However, several important issues would need to be considered before implementation of such a program. Officers should not be expected to acquire the required competencies without appropriate training resources being made available to them. Also, TAR officers in warfare specialties that demand completion of operational career milestones are likely to have limited motivation to gain Naval Reserve management-related competencies, if the promotion criteria used by selection boards emphasizes operational experience and expertise significantly over Reserve management expertise.

The nine competencies together are fairly encompassing; they represent the areas of expertise in which TAR officers should be proficient to best serve and manage the Reserve community and to best support the mission of the U.S. Navy.

B. CONCLUSIONS

1. TAR Officer Professional Standards

The TAR officer community would benefit from the establishment of professional standards; such standards could help to define and develop professionalism among this cadre of officers in their area of expertise – that of Naval Reserve management. Training and Administration of the Reserve officers should possess, or be developing towards, a baseline level of proficiency in each of the nine competencies identified in this report. The competencies are complex, yet much of the competency learning process is currently left to on-the-job-training. Unfortunately, the wide variation in job-related exposure to Naval Reserve management among TAR officers produces inconsistent development in each competency. Hence, there is a significant need for a training and development program that can provide consistent baseline training to TAR officers and that can address the specific learning needs of TAR officers at different, key career phases. Such a program would constitute a major step beyond the valuable, but limited, formal training currently offered to TAR officers.

2. Training Objectives

To demonstrate baseline proficiency in each competency, TAR officers should be able to demonstrate attainment of specific training objectives that capture key aspects of each competency. While not intended to be all-inclusive, a list of objectives is provided below as a foundation for training objectives of a TAR professional development

program. These objectives were either abstracted verbatim from the interviews or were derived by the researcher, based on analysis of the interviews. As applicable, some objectives are addressed to all TAR officers, while others are specific to a career phase, such as junior or senior levels.

There likely is no one method for best demonstrating attainment of all objectives; a variety of methods, each applicable to different types of objectives, is needed. Possible methods for demonstrating attainment of objectives could include: a written or oral board; a PQS-type check-off list to be completed through on-the-job demonstration; formal classroom training, or an interactive computer-based course.

The objectives are listed below and are grouped by competency. Junior TAR officers should be able to complete non-asterisked objectives, at a minimum, and may also need to complete asterisked objectives, depending on their job. Senior TAR officers should be able to complete all objectives, including those with asterisks (*).

a. Training Objectives for Competency #1 - Understanding RESCEN/NAR/-NARCEN Department Operations

- Understand and describe the primary functional areas at a field-level Reserve activity (RESCEN, NAR/NARCEN).
- Identify the pertinent instructions that provide rules, procedures, and guidance in each area. Demonstrate ability to find specific references to explain the mechanics of each process or to answer questions posed by department personnel or by the drilling Reservists, in particular, BUPERS 1001.39 and COMNAVRESFORINST 1001.5.
- Compare and contrast the different types of training orders (AT, ADT, ADSW, IDTT, etc.) and explain how travel and entitlements differ under each order type.
- Explain and illustrate how training is planned, accomplished, and recorded.
- Describe the required processes in medical, supply, administration, drill pay, personnel, and other functions, as defined in applicable instructions and policies. Apply guidance from pertinent instructions to the management of these functions.
- Describe and interpret the current Reserve policies regarding the training and administration of Reservists. Translate the policies to recognize how they pertain to the department operations at the field-level Reserve activity.

b. Training Objectives for Competency #2 - Understanding the Naval Reserve and its “Fit” with the Active Navy

Objectives Relating to Mission and Administrative /Operational Commands:

- State the mission of the Naval Reserve.
- Describe how this mission complements the mission of the U.S. Navy.
- Explain the organizational structure of the Naval Reserve, in terms of:
 - wiring diagram from Echelon II to Echelon VI and chain of command, and
 - types, functions of the various Naval Reserve activities.
- Identify the types of activities to which TAR officers are assigned.
- Identify the operational forces and assets of the Naval Reserve.
- Describe and illustrate how the Reserve operational forces interact with the active Navy.
- Describe and illustrate the chain of command for the Reserve operational forces.

Objectives Relating to Reserve Fit with active Navy:

- Compare and contrast mobilization training and contributory support.
- Discover and/or verify the types of Reserve support desired by the CINCs/gaining commands associated with a Reserve activity, such as: exercise support; coastal warfare force providers; Seabees; hardware repair; personnel augmentation for aircraft carriers; hospitals, etc.
- Discuss the TAR officer’s advisory role to the CINCs/gaining commands regarding:
 - different methods (orders) for assessing their Reservists (AT, ADT, ADSW, IDTT, mobilization/recall, etc.);
 - difference among various types of orders in terms of funding, duration, etc.;
 - what skills the Naval Reservists offer; and
 - the CINCs/gaining commands’ role in creating or changing a Reserve billet or unit.

Objectives Relating to Understanding the U.S. Navy and DoD:

- Describe and illustrate the general organization of the U.S. Navy, including functional codes, CINCs, regional Navy commands, etc.
- Explain how the active Navy differs administratively from that of the Naval Reserve.

- Explain how the active Navy differs operationally from that of the Naval Reserve.
- Describe the general organization of the DoD, including the chain of command from the TAR officer's activity to the President.*
- Identify who, outside of the TAR officer's immediate activity, are the key Navy or DoD decision makers that impact the organization or individual TAR officer ("who's who in the zoo?"). Summarize their impact.*

c. Training Objectives for Competency #3 - Understanding Manpower Processes

Objectives Relating to Macro Level (billet creation and structuring processes):

- Explain why Reserve units and billets are established.
- Describe what control the Naval Reserve has over Reserve billet creation.
- Define endstrength and explain how it impacts billet creation.
- Recognize, define and interpret a ROC POE and an AMD.*
- Understand and describe how requirements are determined.*
- Understand and describe how a billet is created.
- Define TFMMS and explain why it is important.*
- Understand and describe how a billet is structured and resourced.
- Define and provide and example of a resource sponsor.*
- Define and provide and example of a claimant.*
- Explain the relationship between billets, resource sponsors, and claimants.*
- Compare and contrast a funded requirement and an unfunded requirement.*
- Summarize and demonstrate ability to apply guidance provided in OPNAVINST 1001.16J.*

Objectives Relating to Micro Level (Reserve personnel assignment processes):

- Understand and describe how the Naval Reserve fills billets with people.
- Interpret a RUAD.
- Interpret RFAS codes and explain how they are established.
- Describe when it is appropriate to try to change a billet and what the process is.

- Interpret the term “AUIC visibility” and provide illustration of its use.
- Summarize and demonstrate ability to apply guidance provided in BUPERSINST 1001.39.

d. Training Objectives for Competency #4 - Expertise to be a Commanding Officer

- Describe and analyze the challenges involved with command leadership.
- Identify and demonstrate ability to apply the references and resources concerning the Navy’s personnel policies in such areas as fraternization, sexual harassment, and discrimination.
- Describe the Navy’s legal system, processes, and resources, such as the UCMJ. Demonstrate ability to manage a legal process at a Reserve activity.
- Describe the Navy’s enlisted personnel advancement system. Analyze and evaluate the advancement system at a Reserve activity.
- Demonstrate effective public relations skills, including ability to apply concepts of media training.
- Explain what shore installation management encompasses, including the areas of facilities management and environmental protection.
- Describe, in summary, U.S. Code, Title 10.

e. Training Objectives for Competency #5 - Understanding the Mobilization Process

- Understand and describe the overall mobilization process, from start to finish, including a discussion of the initiation of mobilization; generation of mobilization orders; activities of the key players in the process, and roles of each activity.
- Delineate the specific responsibilities and steps of the TAR officer’s command or of those under his/her command in the mobilization process.
- Explain the impact of these steps on subsequent steps in the mobilization process.

f. Training Objectives for Competency #6 - Ability to Use or Manipulate Information Systems

- Define each of the following information system acronyms and explain the general purpose of each system: NSIPS, RSTARS, NOW, TFMMS, RUAD, RHS, IMAPMIS, RTSS, and FASTDATA.
- Identify the activity or echelon level that inputs the data (operator manipulation) for each system.
- Describe the impact each system has upon the other processes impacting the Naval Reserve.

- As a TAR officer at a field-level Reserve activity (i.e., RESCEN, NAR, NARCEN), identify the systems that require operator-level knowledge versus general, working knowledge.
- As a TAR officer at a mid-echelon-level activity (i.e., REDCOM), identify the systems that require operator-level knowledge versus general, working knowledge.
- As a TAR officer at a high-echelon-level activity (i.e., COMNAVRESFOR), identify the systems that require operator-level knowledge versus general, working knowledge.

g. Training Objectives for Competency #7 - Understanding Financial Processes Applicable to the Job

Objectives Relating to the Macro-level:

- Explain where the Reserve Force obtains its funding.
- Describe and illustrate the funding flow from appropriations in the U. S. defense budget, to funds designated for the Naval Reserve, to funds that a storekeeper at an echelon V activity can charge on a government credit card.*
- Compare and contrast the two types of funding, RPN and O&M, NR funds, with respect to what expenses each type funds.
- Summarize and describe the PPBS system.*
- Describe the POM process and a POM cycle. Explain how to POM for billets.*
- Identify resource sponsors and describe their role.*

Objectives Relating to the Micro-level:

- Identify funding source for each type of training orders, such as AT or ADT orders.
- Describe management of AT/ ADT funds by fund originators. Analyze the roles the CINCs and gaining commands play in determining ADT funding.
- Describe and illustrate how a field-level Reserve activity acquires each type of funding.
- Describe how a field-level Reserve activity manages AT funding for its drilling Reservists.
- Understand and demonstrate ability to effectively manage a command's OPTAR.
- Delineate what oversight a TAR CO should provide to his/her storekeeper's job (contracts, uniforms, etc.).

- Understand and demonstrate ability to effectively perform the monthly reconciliation of a command's Government Commercial Purchase Card.
- Delineate what management oversight a TAR CO should provide to his/her command's Government Travel Charge Card program.

h. Training Objectives for Competency #8 - Expertise to be a Staff Officer

(Required for officers in ranks of 0-5 or 0-6, or those assigned to a major staff)

- Describe the work procedures and processes of the major staff to which the TAR officer is assigned.*
- Demonstrate ability to research an issue, including finding the source for accurate information regarding a topic. (Information sources can include both documents and people.)*
- Demonstrate proficiency in strategic communication skills. Effectively summarize and present information and issues to others. Demonstrate ability to effectively write point papers and other reports; present face-to-face briefs; use persuasion, and choose appropriate media.*
- Describe how decisions are made at the TAR officer's staff and identify the major decision makers. Identify what key players influence these decision makers.*

i. Training Objectives for Competency #9 - Skills in Project Management

- Understand what methods, processes, and tools project management offers to improve the TAR officer's ability to manage projects. (Specifically address the areas of scheduling and cost control, risk management, quality management, contracting, and resource allocation.)
- Demonstrate ability to apply dimensions of project management applicable to management of complex projects faced by the TAR officer at his/her job or command.

The current lack of a comprehensive, consistent training pipeline significantly hampers TAR officer development in Naval Reserve management. Formal training that targets career phase-specific learning needs, such as those represented in the objectives above, could narrow the competency gaps discussed in Chapter V.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the data analysis and conclusions of this study, seven recommendations are provided that might assist in developing consistent, baseline TAR officer expertise in Reserve management. These recommendations are to:

- Use the nine competencies identified in this study as the foundation for development of TAR officer professional standards. A training and development program to foster development of these competencies should be created, which, like that of any training and development program, should be rooted in defined training objectives. The training objectives should reflect specific skills, knowledge, and abilities embodied by the nine TAR officer core competencies.
- Conduct additional research to further define which specific skill dimensions of each competency are required for individual TAR officer billets, as well as for general TAR officer career phases. For instance, further research could clarify which specific macro- and micro-level dimensions of the manpower-related competency are required for a junior officer assuming command of a field Reserve activity, versus for a senior officer assuming duty as a RLO. The specific objectives listed in part B of this chapter should be used as the foundation for future research to expand and further clarify the specific KSAs required for distinct types of TAR officer jobs.
- Develop a career-focused training continuum program to offer appropriate training to officers at key flow points of their career, such as at the junior, mid-grade, and senior-officer levels. The data found in this study, as well as additional data to be gathered should be the foundation for this needs-based training. In general, junior TAR officers should receive formal exposure to macro-level competencies, such as gaining familiarity with the billet creation processes within the manpower competency; senior officers should receive formal, in-depth instruction in macro-level elements, to gain proficiency in these competencies. Thus, the content of courses in a training continuum should reflect the specific learning needs of different career phases. Similarly, additional Reserve-specific leadership training should be considered to better prepare junior TAR officers for independent duty as commanding officers of Reserve activities.
- Expand current training resources for TAR officers. Additional research should be conducted to best determine appropriate training and development vehicles. Attainment of baseline proficiency in the competencies requires going beyond using traditional classroom training. Classroom training can be effective in developing knowledge of subject matter. However, the ability to comprehend, apply and evaluate knowledge in real-life job situations can often best be augmented with other medium. Flexible and accessible resources are needed for this geographically dispersed officer population. Informal training, such as establishment of a mentorship program among TAR officers, could also be considered.
- Involve the Naval Reserve Professional Development Center and the TAR officer community manager in a TAR officer training and development program. Current TAR officer course offerings by the NAVRESPROF-

DEVCEN could be used as a foundation from which more need-specific courses could flow. The NAVRESPROFDEVcen's on-going, successful development of flexible, web-based training resources should be continued and expanded in TAR officer course curricula. Effort should be made from within the detailing and/or community management communities to allow for consistent participation in the TAR officer assessment course from all communities.

- Determine how TAR officer professional qualifications could become recognized as essential for career development while not compromising the operational demands and qualification requirements of officer warfare communities. The dual-hatted nature of TAR officers appears, at times, to constrain the opportunities and motivation among TAR officers to develop Naval Reserve management-related expertise. Both operational and Reserve management areas of expertise are critical to the Naval Reserve, and the motivation to professionally develop in both areas is important.
- Improve knowledge management within the TAR officer community. Tools to improve the accessibility of information and the sharing of Reserve-management related knowledge could enhance proficiency of competencies. Information regarding Reserve management is dynamic and TAR officers need a systematic way to be updated on significant changes affecting their job. A vehicle such as a TAR officer community newsletter could serve as a means to share changes, suggestions, concerns and other information among TAR officers. The TAR officer community is a learning community that could benefit from efforts directed at strengthening knowledge management.

Top-down emphasis by Naval Reserve leadership on the value of continued professional development of the TAR officer community is key to a successful training and development program. A training and development program would likely require more time and resources than are currently incurred for TAR officer training. However, the resources required to further develop a TAR officer expertise in Reserve management should be considered a valuable investment, both for individual TAR officers and for the entire Reserve community.

APPENDIX A. ACRONYM GUIDE

AT	Annual Training
ADT	Active Duty Training
ADSW	Active Duty for Special Work
BUPERS	Bureau of Naval Personnel
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CO	Commanding Officer
COMNAVAIRESFOR	Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force
COMNAVRESFOR	Commander, Naval Reserve Force
COMNAVSURFRESFOR	Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force
IDT	Inactive Duty Training
IDTT	Inactive Duty Training Travel
IMAPMIS	Inactive Manpower and Personnel Management Information System
NAR	Naval Air Reserve
NARCEN	Naval Air Reserve Center
NOW	New Order Writing
NAVRESPROFDEVVCEN	Naval Reserve Professional Development Center
NSIPS	Navy Standard Integrated Personnel System
O&MNR	Operations and Maintenance, Naval Reserve
PCO	Prospective Commanding Officer
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System

PQS	Professional Qualification Standards
REDCOM	Reserve Readiness Center
RESCEN	Reserve Center
RESFORON	Reserve Force Squadron
RFAS	Reserve Functional Area and Sex Code
RHS	Reserve Headquarters System
RLO	Reserve Liaison Officer
RPN	Reserve Personnel Navy
RSTARS	Reserve Standard Training Administration and Readiness Support
RTSS	Reserve Training Support System
RUAD	Reserve Unit Assignment Document
SELRES	Selected Reservist
TAD	Temporary Additional Duty
TAR	Training and Administration of the Naval Reserve
TFMMS	Total Force Manpower Management System
TOA	TAR Officer Assession
XO	Executive Officer

APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW GUIDE

Lead-In/ Set the Stage:

There's concern that there is an inconsistent level of knowledge and expertise among TAR officers in fundamental, critical areas of Reserve management. In this interview, I'm interested in learning what you consider to be the key, fundamental "nuggets" of knowledge or expertise regarding Reserve management that every TAR officer should possess. I'm also interested in learning whether, in your experience, you have seen significant gaps between what TAR officers *should* know and what they *do* know in fundamental areas of Reserve management, and if so, what you feel the critical gaps are.

Demographics: (Only take about one minute)

- How long have you been a TAR officer?
- What is your designator/?
- What has been your TAR tour history? (RESCEN CO, staff, RLO, etc.)

TAR Core Competencies: KEY QUESTIONS OF SURVEY

"Core competencies" are defined as fundamental areas of expertise, i.e., knowledge or skills, which are required to be competent in a profession.

1. a. What do you consider to be the fundamental core competencies relating to Naval Reserve management that every TAR officer, regardless of designator, should possess?
 - prompt: i.e., what should a TAR officer be proficient in to be successful in managing the Naval Reserve?
 - It might help to divide out certain phases or grade levels during a TAR officer's career during which different competencies are required. If so, please divide out such phases for me.
 - b. For each competency mentioned, what degree of detail/depth should a TAR officer have?
2. In your experience, have you seen significant gaps between what TAR officers should know and what they do know in fundamental areas of Reserve management? If so, what do you feel the critical gaps are?

Time Permitting: Training/Professional Development:

3. For each of the competency areas discussed:
 - a. How would you recommend that a TAR officer acquire this competency? (Written Resources? Formal school? Work experience?)
 - b. How did you personally develop this competency? (Written resources? Work experience?)

Conclusion:

Later I will e-mail you list of all essential competencies identified from these interviews and will ask you to prioritize them.

APPENDIX C. ELECTRONIC SURVEY

COMPETENCIES FOR TAR OFFICERS

Directions: Please rank the competencies listed below (1 for the most essential competency; 9 for the least essential competency.

COMPETENCY	RANKING
Understanding MANPOWER processes (Macro: Manpower “101,” billet creation/structuring, claimants, resourcing, etc.; Micro: unit personnel assignment /RUAD management/RFAS)	
Understanding of RESCEN/NAR/NARCEN DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS (Familiarity with instructions and policies on processes, including: admin, drill Pay, orders/travel (AT, ADT ADSW, IDTT), training plans; ability to properly refer to source instruction/policy for guidance on processes.)	
Understanding FINANCIAL processes applicable to your job or level (Macro: military appropriations/funding, PPBS/budget, POM processes; Micro/Command; OPTAR, supply/logistics)	
Understanding the NAVAL RESERVE FORCE ORGANIZATION and its “fit” with active Navy (Reserve mission; administrative organization; operational forces; relationship with gaining commands/CINCs; role as advisors to Active Navy; differences between Reserve and Active Navy)	
Understanding the MOBILIZATION process (Overall flow of events; mechanics of mobilization process at your activity)	
Skills in PROJECT MANAGEMENT (scheduling and cost control, risk mgmt, quality, contracting; resource allocation, etc.)	
Ability to use or manipulate INFORMATION SYSTEMS (Hands-on or general knowledge, as applicable, of NSIPS, RSTARS, NOW, TFMMS, RHS, IMAPMIS, etc.; general computer skills)	
Expertise to be a STAFF OFFICER (Procedures, processes of working on a major staff; issue research; ability to “staff” issues; “working within the system,” etc.)	
Expertise to be a COMMANDING OFFICER (Leadership; UCMJ, Title 10, Regular Navy’s People Policies (sexual harassment, fraternization, etc.); personnel advancement, public relations, etc.)	

Please feel free to state below any additional thoughts or input you have regarding TAR officer core competencies.

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APPENDIX D. SURVEY RESPONSES

	<u>Respondents</u>		<u>Competencies</u>						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	3	1	6	2	5	9	4	8	7
2	5	2	3	4	7	8	6	9	1
3	3	1	8	4	2	9	5	6	7
4	1	5	2	3	6	7	8	9	4
5	6	1	5	7	4	9	3	8	2
6	7	1	6	2	3	9	8	5	4
7	4	1	7	2	6	8	5	9	3
8	3	1	4	2	8	9	7	6	5
9	6	3	5	2	4	9	8	7	1
10	3	2	7	1	5	8	4	9	6
11	8	2	9	3	4	6	5	7	1
12	4	7	8	3	2	9	1	5	6
13	2	3	4	1	5	7	6	9	8
14	2	6	9	1	7	8	3	4	5
15	2	1	5	3	4	9	8	7	6
16	5	1	3	2	6	9	7	8	4
17 *	1	1	3	6	4	7	5	5	1
18	2	4	7	1	3	9	6	8	5

* Respondent did not use 1-9 ranking, however, did not change the overall averages.

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Deputy Chief of Staff, Training (N7)
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Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force
New Orleans, Louisiana
10. Captain Butch Hollyfield, USNR
Deputy Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force
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11. Commander Kathy Isrig, USNR
DCOS, Manpower (N1)
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12. RADM John McLaughlin, USNR
Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force
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16. Captain Tandy Brannan, USNR
ACNPC for Naval Reserve Personnel Management
Naval Personnel Command
Millington, Tennessee
17. RADM John C. Harvey, Jr., USN
ACNPC Total Force Programming, M&I Resource Mgmt
Naval Personnel Command
Washington, D.C.
18. Lieutenant Commander Carol Newman, USNR
Arlington, Virginia